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ABSTRACT 
 
 Since the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2012, health plans serving Medicare 
beneficiaries have begun receiving sizeable incentives (>$1B) for demonstrating high ratings to 
quality performance scores in CMS’s Medicare star ratings program. Several of the quality 
measures can be directly impacted by retail pharmacists (e.g., medication adherence measures), 
resulting in health plans implementing programs designed to incentive retail pharmacies to work 
toward improving their own performance related to quality measures. While awareness of these 
value-based incentive (VBI) programs is growing, there is still a significant lack of research 
which elucidates the nature of these programs and the potential impact they are having on the 
field of retail pharmacy. This dissertation attempts to provide a better understanding of the 
impact of VBI programs on retail pharmacy through three parts. The first paper provides a 
categorization of the three primary strategies which are being employed through current VBI 
programs. Furthermore, the paper summarizes and provides anecdotal evidence of five distinct 
programs which are being considered or implemented. The second paper explores retail 
pharmacy’s perception of the impact of quality measures and VBI programs through quality 
research with retail pharmacy managers. The third paper evaluates the financial impact to retail 
pharmacies of three potential VBI programs. The results of this dissertation provide a step 
forward in exploring how retail pharmacy is being affected by healthcare’s shift toward 
achieving quality performance ratings. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Background 
 
 In 1965, proponents for public health reform passed amendments to the Social Security 
Act under President Johnson that effectively created Medicaid and Medicare (Hoffman, 2003).  
Medicare exists as a nationally funded and run program that provides health insurance primarily 
to the elderly population through payroll taxes on the rest of the population (CMS, 2015).  
United States citizens eligible for Medicare include those aged 65 or older, those under 65 with 
certain disabilities, and individuals of any age with End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD).  Medicare 
was further expanded in 2003 with the passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement 
and Modernization Act (MMA).  The legislation allowed private health plans to also provide 
insurance to Medicare beneficiaries, called Part C or Medicare Advantage (MA) plans.  
Additionally, the legislation established an optional drug benefit that became available to 
beneficiaries in 2006 entitled “Part D” (CMS, 2015).   
As the administrative agency of Medicare, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare 
Services (CMS) attempts to ensure that its beneficiaries have access to and receive high-quality 
health care (APhA, 2013).  Considering the increasing costs to Medicare, this mission is as 
important as ever.   It is for this reason that in 2007, CMS developed a Medicare star rating 
system that measures and reports on quality measures associated with Medicare plans (APhA, 
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2013).  Plans are rated from 1 to 5 stars, with 5 stars representing the highest quality rating a plan 
can receive (Jacobson et al., 2011).   
The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 designated that MA-only plans 
and MA plans with Part D (MA-PD) would begin receiving bonus incentives based upon the star 
rating that the plan received (Jacobson et al., 2011).  In 2012, these payment models went into 
effect, providing bonus payments to plans with 4 or more stars. CMS also launched a 3-year 
demonstration project in 2012 granting smaller bonuses to plans rated as average (3 or 3.5 stars) 
in the hopes of incentivizing more plans to strive for higher star ratings. Data shows that plans 
have continually progressed to higher star ratings since bonus payments were implemented 
(HLMedit, 2014).  
Star ratings are currently comprised of 47 measures, with Part C plans evaluated with 32 
measures and Part D plans evaluated with 15 measures (CMS Star Ratings Technical Notes, 
2015).  Of the 47 measures, 10 are triple-weighted, which translates into each of the measures 
accounting for a much higher impact on a plan’s overall star rating. Of these 10 measures, eight 
are considered to be able to be influenced either directly or indirectly by medication therapy 
(APhA, 2013).  At one point, five of these measures were estimated to account for approximately 
19% of Part C ratings and 54% of Part D star ratings. Since then, some measures have changed, 
with the current measures most directly linked with pharmacy practice including medication 
adherence for three chronic disease states (oral diabetes, hypertension, and cholesterol) and 
medication-therapy management (MTM) program completion rate for comprehensive medication 
review (CMR). (CMS Star Ratings, 2017)   
Given the high degree of influence pharmacists can have on these measures, it is no 
wonder that community pharmacies’ influence on star ratings are being more closely considered.  
 3 
In fact, payers have now started to utilize data assessing individual pharmacy quality measures to 
determine how their performance is impacting the plan’s star ratings (Stolpe, 2015, Smart 
Retailing, 2014). 
 
Health Plan Value-Based Incentive Programs 
 Using plan and third-party data to evaluate individual pharmacy stores’ performance 
scores, many MA-PD plans have begun to implement incentive programs that encourage 
pharmacies to boost star rating scores (Stolpe, 2015; Deniger, 2015) (Bonner, 2016).  These 
value-based incentive (VBI) programs include both punishing and rewarding pharmacies in 
response to various quality performance metrics. The most common store performance measures 
evaluated are the three patient medication adherence measures included in CMS star ratings: oral 
diabetes, hypertension, and cholesterol (Rawal et al., 2015; Moose & Logan, 2016). While the 
three patient medication adherence scores appear to be the primary focus (SilverScript, 2014; 
IEHP, 2016), other plans have utilized additional performance measures including how often the 
pharmacy dispenses generic products (when available) over brands, and how often 90 day 
supplies of medications are dispensed (Deniger, 2015). 
 The VBI programs used by healthcare plans to boost performance measures appear to 
vary widely. However, several reports on individual plans exist. One VBI program includes 
giving bonus payments to pharmacies in response to their performance measures (Logan & 
Logan, 2013).  In these programs, bonus payments are awarded as lump sums in either regular 
intervals or annually to a pharmacy store. Bonus incentive programs appear to be structured in 
one of two different schemes: a tournament or threshold system (Rawal et al, 2015).  In a 
tournament system, the plan allocates one lump sum to split between all pharmacies within their 
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network.  Pharmacies with higher performance scores get a larger proportion of the bonus 
money, with those scoring lowest getting the lowest amount, if any at all.  In a threshold system, 
pharmacies that meet certain threshold requirements (i.e. store-level adherence for patients 
taking oral anti-diabetics at 80%) are awarded with either a flat bonus payment or perhaps a 
bonus percentage of all medication transactions with network beneficiaries. In a threshold 
system, multiple thresholds can also exist where increasing pharmacy performance ratings 
constitutes higher bonus payments (Rawal et al., 2015; Maxwell, 2015).  
 A second type of VBI program is changing reimbursement fees in response to pharmacy 
performance ratings (Maxwell, 2015).  In each transaction where the cost of a medication is 
reimbursed from a health insurance entity, a dispensing fee for the pharmacist is included in the 
total cost. Similar to the threshold system of bonus incentives, the increase to dispensing fee 
reimbursement can vary as higher levels of pharmacy performance are achieved.  
Another VBI program includes the altering of direct and indirect remuneration (DIR) fees 
(Maxwell, 2015). This can refer to two distinct processes at a pharmacy: 1) the reconciliation of 
contractual terms between plans/ pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and pharmacies with 
actual reimbursement, and 2) a fee that pharmacies must pay to participate in a network 
(Maxwell, 2015). In the course of the many adjudications that occur between the pharmacy and 
plan/PBM when patients claim medications, the actual reimbursement owed to the pharmacy is 
often not fully realized until a reconciliation occurs after some period.  At this time, any 
additional reimbursement owed by the plan/ PBM is awarded to the pharmacy. For the “pay-to-
play” fees, reports suggest plans might try to incentive pharmacies by reducing the fee for 
pharmacies that have high performance scores.  The fee is usually attached to each medication 
transaction, and reports suggest on average it is around 5% (Maxwell, 2015; Moose & Logan, 
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2016).  Multiple thresholds of pharmacy performance may again be present in this strategy, 
where higher performance ratings a pharmacy achieves results in a lower fee the pharmacy may 
have to pay.  
The final set of programs includes changes to the pharmacy’s place in a health plan’s 
network.  Most simply this involves a plan or PBM simply excluding low-performing 
pharmacies from their network (Stople, 2015). This can cause potential gains or losses in 
pharmacies as pharmacies are included in a network or excluded from it, respectively. Another 
variation in network management can involve changes in the form of preferred and non-preferred 
network pharmacies (Gebhart, 2014; Fein, 2015).  Patients are still allowed to get reimbursed at 
all pharmacies; however, patients will have lower co-pays at those are considered “preferred.”  
While this practice does not directly reward or punish pharmacies based upon performance 
scores, patients may naturally shift their business to pharmacies with lower co-pays, thereby 
resulting in more business for such pharmacies (Fein, 2015).  In this way, a plan/ PBM can 
indirectly reward those pharmacies with high performance scores while simultaneously 
punishing pharmacies with low scores.  Additionally, the plan might also assume whatever 
factors that caused current patients to be more adherent at one pharmacy might improve 
adherence for those patients that shift to the “preferred” pharmacy, thereby increasing overall 
beneficiary adherence star ratings (Gebhart, 2014).  
It should be noted while both sets of network practices existed prior to the advent of the 
CMS star rating bonus payments, most network decisions to this point have been based upon 
contractual agreements.  For instance, employees of large chain pharmacy retail stores often are 
required by their insurance provider (i.e. the chain retail pharmacy) to obtain their medications at 
the same set of chain retail pharmacies, either by not covering other pharmacies or by providing 
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lower co-pays by using the same retail chain pharmacy (Gebhart, 2014).  However, as MA-PD 
plans continue to strategize how to boost their own star ratings, network change programs are 
certainly a viable option that can and are being used. To the principal investigator’s knowledge, 
no research has been conducted to acquire a comprehensive understanding of all of the programs 
implemented and being considered to date. 
 
Potential Financial Impact of Star Ratings on Pharmacy Stores 
 To date, there is no literature estimating the overall impact of health plans’ VBI programs 
on pharmacies.  However, a few reports of how individual pharmacies have been impacted are 
available.  One report listed a single pharmacy’s experience with a bonus payment incentive 
structure (Deniger, 2015).  The pharmacy received a total of $1190 in bonus payments 
throughout the entire 2014 year.  This amount is a reflection of the pharmacy performing highly 
on the RAAS agent adherence measure (90.48%) and statin therapy adherence measure 
(92.16%), well above the 5-star benchmarks for each group of 84% and 78%, respectively.  The 
store found that 75% of its patients were adherent to oral diabetes medications, lower than the 5-
star benchmark goal of 85%. The pharmacy was listed as a medium-load pharmacy, averaging 
250-350 prescriptions per day. 
 Additional reports suggest similar overall payment incentives for pharmacists through 
VBI programs (Maxwell, 2015, IEHP, 2016), weighted on the number of beneficiaries the 
pharmacy serves.  Although the number may seem small at first, a consideration must be made 
that there may be as many types of VBI programs as there are unique Medicare programs 
represented through patients. Thus, while the impact of individual VBI programs may seem 
small, the total impact of all programs may be much larger for pharmacies with high 
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performance scores. Further research is necessary to understand the amount pharmacies can 
stand to gain or lose based upon their own performance ratings. 
 
Previous Literature on Provider Performance Programs 
Considering the limited literature on pharmacy VBI programs, a look at previous 
literature surrounding pay-for-performance incentive programs for other providers is warranted.  
The types of physician performance incentive structures include performance bonuses, fee 
schedules, and network lockouts. Physician performance bonuses are synonymous with 
pharmacy bonus payments, where performance scores can dictate whether and how large 
financial bonuses occur (Rosenthal et al., 2004). Fee schedules refer to increases in 
reimbursements to fee-for-services models of healthcare, wherein the physician is reimbursed a 
specific fee for services rendered.  As healthcare shifts to value-based models of reimbursement, 
one way to accomplish this is simply applying a value-based “adjustment” to traditional 
reimbursements (CMS, 2016).  Like this practice for physicians, the dispensing fee adjustment or 
DIR fee adjustments based upon performance ratings apply a simple way to incorporate value 
adjustments to pharmacy practice as a way to incentivize higher performance ratings. 
 Unlike the previously outlined VBI programs, “physician tiering” provides an example 
of a potential future VBI program for pharmacists (Stone & Sullivan, 2007).  Physician tiering 
refers using claims data to assess the quality of performance of providers, as well as their cost-
efficiency relative to respective peers.  This is differentiated from previous “economic 
credentialing”, wherein high-cost physicians were terminated from the network. Physician tiering 
places physicians on at least 2 tiers of “preference” for the patient to use the physician. The most 
basic form this can take for physicians to be placed on either a “preferred” tier or a “non-
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preferred” tier.  Tier placement is commonly based upon cost and quality ratings. The tiers and 
ratings are made known to patients, whom are generally steered to higher-performing physicians 
(i.e. more “preferred” tiers) through lower copayments. Additionally, physicians on higher tiers 
may receive performance bonuses, effectively receiving both direct (bonus payments) and 
indirect (more patients) incentives to increase performance scores. 
There are several reasons why limited-network benefit designs are more popular than 
tiered benefit designs for physicians (Ginsburg & Pawlson, 2014).  The first recognizes the 
overall complexity of attempting to provide tiering for many different types of physicians.  
Furthermore, providing a way for beneficiaries to access and adequately comprehend the 
differences between differently tiered entities would be cumbersome.  The second reason limited 
network benefit structures are more popular is that the access of only a limited amount of 
providers, albeit likely more cost-efficient to the plan, allows for a smaller premium to be paid 
for by the patient.  Finally, many prominent hospitals are resistant to contracting with payers 
under a tiered benefit design unless the entire hospital and all of its services/ employees are 
placed in the preferred tier. This implies a nationally recognized oncologist and a cardiologist 
with terrible patient outcomes who work under the same hospital system would fall under the 
same tier.  Given many physicians today are employed under a large health system, this presents 
a problem.   
A tiering design for retail pharmacies might be much more applicable, given performance 
ratings, for the time being, appear to be applied to the store-level rather than the individual-level 
(Rawal et al., 2015; Moose & Logan, 2016).  It is uncertain whether patients might fully 
comprehend differential performance ratings a plan might present.  However, it is certainly 
suggested lower copayments for patients increases patient adherence (Taira et al., 2006), thereby 
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increasing pharmacy performance ratings (Chernow et al., 2008).  One criticism of physician 
tiering is physicians might not always be able to handle higher patient loads as an outcome of 
lower payments through a high tier placement (Stone & Sullivan, 2007).  Pharmacies are 
potentially better equipped to handle higher patient loads in this regard, since an increased 
frequency of 10-20 patients per day (300-600 patients per month) might not push pharmacy 
resources as much as it might physician office resources. Issues might still arise for large chain 
pharmacies in regard to applying a single tier structure to a single entity of the chain. 
In conclusion, while most reports of pharmacy VBI programs closely reflect previously 
established practices for physician incentive strategies, pharmacists may also need to consider 
the possibility of pharmacy tiering as a future incentive program that payers may explore. 
  
Pharmacist Reactions 
 Currently, there is little literature evaluating pharmacists’ attitudes and perspectives of 
plans implementing VBI programs and associated evaluation of store-level quality performance 
meausres.  Meterko et al. (2006) proposed a conceptual framework of how provider attitudes 
toward pay-for-performance programs affect practice behaviors, including how providers 
respond to pay-for-performance incentive programs.  Their study proposed that three primary 
domains affected provider attitudes: the characteristics of the incentive program, the practice 
environment of the provider, and the background characteristics of the provider. The 
characteristics of the incentive program included the structural features (types of measures, target 
recipient, reward mechanism, and availability of feedback), and the communication features. The 
practice environment domain was made up of many autonomy, normative, and social support 
features such as whether the practice was group or solo, the type of information and support 
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systems available, the overall practice culture, experience of the practice executives, and 
community practice norms. Finally, the demographic and background domain was thought to 
consist of years of practice of the individual, specialty, and whether the participant had a 
professional school appointment. 
Meterko et al. (2006) also conceptualize seven critical dimensions of provider attitudes 
related to quality targets and incentives: 1) awareness and understanding of the incentive 
program, 2) salience of the financial incentives, 3) clinical relevance of the quality targets, 4) 
control over the resources needed to achieve the quality targets, 5) fairness in the administration 
of the incentive program, 6) frequency and nature of performance feedback provided, and 7) 
possible unintended consequences associated with the pursuit of the quality targets. The authors 
hypothesized that each of the dimensions affected whether a change in practice behavior might 
be seen towards achieving quality targets. The authors developed a survey instrument and tested 
it in a large sample of physicians to test construct validity of the attitudinal dimensions on 
perceived impact of quality targets, and incentives on clinical practice behavior.  The authors 
found evidence to support most of the dimensions, except for fairness and performance feedback, 
for which cooperation (i.e. support from other providers) and perceived impact of the incentive 
program were found to be significant dimensions of provider attitudes toward incentive 
programs. Meterko et al.’s (2006) work provides a valid basis to consider overall pharmacy 
attitudes and behaviors for pay-for-performance programs.   
Management theory suggests that many factors contribute to the awareness and strategic 
decisions of decision-makers.  Work by McMullen & Shepherd (2006) suggests that 
entrepreneurs, in response to uncertainty in their environment, engage in a process of attention 
and evaluation, where individuals engage in gathering and evaluating knowledge based upon 
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characteristics of the individual.  This agrees with Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), who, in 
discussing how and when managers may seek information for an area of uncertainty, suggested 
that uncertainty by itself would not lead to scanning behavior.  Rather, external events would 
need to be perceived as important to organizational performance for managers to attribute any 
interest to them.  In this way, Meterko et al.’s work is in agreement with previous management 
theory and attempts to consider the many attributes that a provider may place on the importance 
of the external event (i.e. incentive programs), thus affecting their information-seeking and 
reactions to these events. 
 Applied to pharmacy VBI programs, Meterko et al.’s conceptual framework provides a 
foundation for considering how pharmacists are reacting to these programs. The framework 
compares well to the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1985), which suggests that 
intentions to change behavior (i.e. try to meet quality targets) are a factor of attitudes, normative 
beliefs, and perceived control. Meterko et al.’s model, in finding cooperation as a major 
dimension of attitudes through its exploratory factor analysis, essentially broadened many of the 
dimensions of TPB.  Awareness/ understanding, financial salience, clinical relevance, and 
perceived impact might all fall under the broader scope of general attitudes of the TPB. 
Likewise, cooperation might be similar to normative beliefs, with taken a step further with not 
only the beliefs of what others think should be done, but also help to do so.  Finally, control over 
the resources needed from Meterko et al.’s model can be seen as synonymous as perceived 
control to change behavior.  Actual behavioral control (i.e. how well changing behaviors actually 
allows one to reach quality measurement target) can also be seen in the same light as unintended 
consequences posited by Meterko et al.’s model. Given the high degree of support for the TPB, 
recognizing how Meterko et al.’s model fits within the dimensions of it helps provide additional 
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support how its framework might provide a sound foundation for understanding how pharmacists 
evaluate VBI programs.  
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Research Objectives 
 
 Health plans are already considering and implementing various value-based incentive 
(VBI) programs to boost star ratings from the pharmacy store-level.  However, little literature 
has been published outlining the specific programs and the financial impact on pharmacy 
practice.  Additionally, little published research has considered the reaction of pharmacists to 
VBI programs.  The following specific aims are designated for this dissertation are:  
 
1. Provide a categorization of strategies employed by known VBI programs and provide 
anecdotal evidence of potential programs being implemented by health plans to 
incentive improvement of retail pharmacy-related quality measures (Paper 1) 
2. Understand pharmacist attitudes and perceptions of quality measures and the impact 
of VBI programs (Paper 2) 
3. Using Mississippi Medicare claims data, estimate store-level performance to select 
quality measures and evaluate the financial impact of possible pharmacy VBI 
programs on retail stores (Paper 3) 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECT OF MEDICARE STAR RATINGS ON PHARMACIES:  
PAYER STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE PHARMACY PERFORMANCE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The landscape of healthcare is slowly shifting in lieu of increased attention to quality 
health measures. In 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) announced 
their goal of tying 85% of fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare payments to quality or value by the 
end of 2016.  Additionally, DHHS set a goal that 90% of payments were to be tied to quality or 
value by the end of 2018 (DHHS, 2015).  After the announcement, the Health Care 
Transformation Task Force was quickly formed, which is comprised of a large collection of 
health plans and employers whose aim is to shift 75% of their operations to contracts designed to 
improve health care quality and lower costs by 2020 (Brino, 2015).  
The Medicare star rating system was developed in 2007 by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS). The system analyzes Medicare health plans through quality measures 
and rates plan from 1 to 5 stars, with 5 stars representing the highest quality rating a plan can 
receive (Jacobson et al., 2011). In 2012, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) designated that 
Medicare Advantage plans (MA) and MA plans with Part D (MA-PD) would begin receiving 
bonus incentives based upon the star rating that the plan received. Sizeable incentives are 
provided to those plans with the highest ratings in the star rating system (Galewitz, 2016). Plans 
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can also be designated as “low performing” if they receive an overall star rating of less than three 
stars for three consecutive years. Medicare members enrolled in “low performing” plans are 
notified and provided assistance if they want to shift to a different plan. Additionally, low 
performing plans can lose their contract with Medicare (Jacobson et al., 2011). Both the financial 
incentives for high ratings as well as the potential for enrollee health plan shifting and contract 
termination through low ratings (Herman, 2015) have led most plans to develop strategies to 
raise their star ratings. Data from CMS demonstrated an increasing trend in average star ratings 
for MA-PD plans from 2012 to 2016 (CMS Fact Sheet, 2016), although the increase has since 
plateaued (CMS Fact Sheet, 2018). 
With plans working to maximize their own star ratings, pharmacies’ impact on star 
ratings have become the focus of much attention and discussion.  Recently, it was estimated 
pharmacy related measures account for approximately 19% of Part C star ratings and 54% of 
Part D ratings (Erickson et al., 2014).  While pharmacies’ effect on star ratings has altered some 
with the retiring of some measures (“diabetes measurement” as a triple-weighted measure) and 
the addition of others (“medication therapy management program completion rate for 
comprehensive medication reviews” as a single-weighted measure) (CMS Star Ratings, 2016), 
the impact pharmacies can have on Part D and overall plan ratings is still profound.   
Consequently, pharmacies are being pressured by MA-PD plans to increase their 
performance (Stolpe, 2015). Some reports suggest plans may punish low-performing pharmacies 
by locking them out of their network (SilverScript, 2014).  This would essentially require any 
patients within the plan to shift to another pharmacy for any medications they don’t want to pay 
for completely out-of-pocket, resulting in a loss of business for the pharmacy.  Other plans are 
considering rewarding pharmacies that perform well. For example, a Silverscripts’ program 
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rewards pharmacies with bonuses at the end of the year based upon performance on four distinct 
star measures as well as the number of patients at each pharmacy (Bonner, 2015).    
Research on these value-based incentive (VBI) programs in pharmacy is generally scarce; 
however, the literature on how payers have addressed physician benefit structures may provide 
some insight. For instance, physician benefit structures typically follow one of three approaches: 
changes to fee schedules, limited-networks, and more recently, physician tiering (Rosenthal et 
al., 2004; Stone & Sullivan, 2007; Ginsburg & Pawlson, 2014). Changes to fee schedules 
directly affects the net compensation provided to the healthcare practitioner (Rosenthal et al., 
2004), while limited-networks and physician tiering may affect patient behaviors by either 
encouraging or deterring patients from going to particular practitioners (Stone & Sullivan, 2007).  
Incentivizing prescriber behaviors directly and incentivizing patient behaviors (and thus 
indirectly practitioner behaviors) can be used independently or in conjunction with one another.  
Limited networks are more popular than physician tiering, but that is mostly due to issues with 
effectively tiering physicians who are not in private practice and also adequately informing 
beneficiaries of the differences between tiers for providers (Ginsburg & Pawlson, 2014). Limited 
networks and fee schedules in the form of bonus payments are already previously referenced as 
possible mechanisms that may be used in response to pharmacy quality performance.  
The primary aims of this paper are to provide a categorization of strategies employed by 
known VBI programs and to collect anecdotal evidence of programs being implemented by 
health plans to incentivize improvement of retail pharmacy-related quality measures. 
Furthermore, the paper seeks to identify and explore quality measures being monitored and 
utilized in VBI programs. Anecdotal evidence and information gathered from a survey are used 
to help achieve these aims. 
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Types of VBI Strategies 
 
 There are three types of VBI strategies readily identifiable in the literature. The first two, 
quality payment opportunity (QPO) and value-based contracting (VBC), directly impact a 
pharmacy’s potential revenue through financial rewards offered or punishments levied against a 
pharmacy. The third strategy, quality-based network (QBN), indirectly impacts a pharmacy’s 
potential revenue through affecting the patient volume of a pharmacy. The three types of VBI 
strategies are shown in Figure 1.  
 
FIGURE 2-1. Three Types of VBI Strategies 
  
 
 
 
The QPO strategy is defined as optional rewards or payments dispersed for meeting 
specific goals set by a health plan. These goals are often associated with pharmacies achieving 
high performance on quality-based measures, such as the medication adherence measures used in 
Value-Based 
Incentive (VBI) 
Strategies
Quality Payment 
Opportunity 
(QPO)
Value Based 
Contracting 
(VBC)
Quality Based 
Network
(QBN)
Strategies directly impacting practice revenue 
(often referred to as “pay-for-performance”) 
Strategies indirectly impacting practice revenue 
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CMS star ratings (Jhawar & Rabbitt, 2016; CMS Star Ratings, 2016). One example comes from 
Inland Empire Health Plan (IEHP), which awards bonus payments every 6 months to retail 
pharmacies within its network for meeting specific quality measure metrics, including high rates 
of patient adherence to diabetes, hypertension, and cholesterol medications (Bonner L, 2016). 
These additional payment opportunities do not affect contractual agreements between the health 
plan and pharmacies (e.g., dispensing fees) and offer few disadvantages as they strictly provide 
optional benefit for those able to achieve specific criterion pre-defined by health plans.   
VBC is broadly defined as a strategy where the specific terms of contracting with a 
practice are adjusted based upon performance. Whereas QPO only offers potential rewards for 
high performance, VBC can be risk-sharing and associated with both rewards and penalties 
related to performance.  One of the most widely recognized forms of VBC in retail pharmacy is 
through adjustment of direct and indirect remuneration (DIR) fees based upon quality 
performance.  DIR fees typically encompass “pay to play” fees for network participation 
between pharmacies and health plans or pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) (NCPA, 2017).  In 
relation to quality measures, health plans can reduce the DIR fee assessed to the pharmacy for 
achieving higher quality measure ratings, thereby rewarding the pharmacy (Maxwell, 2015; 
Moose & Logan, 2016). Alternatively, poor pharmacy performance could result in a higher DIR 
fee for the pharmacy.   
Both QPO and VBC strategies are often collectively referred to as “pay-for-performance” 
(P4P) strategies in the literature. The term “P4P” broadly characterizes any strategies which offer 
financial incentivization for achieving good quality outcomes for patients (James, 2012) and is 
widely recognized both inside and outside the scope of incentive strategies related to pharmacies 
(e.g., physician practices) (Mendelsen et al., 2017). The term has been associated with retail 
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pharmacy since at least 2008, when David Nau of the Pharmacy Quality Alliance (PQA) insisted 
P4P programs would soon be implemented to boost pharmacy performance scores (Drug Topics, 
2008).  
The third strategy, QBN, is sometimes referred to as a “narrow network” strategy.  QBN 
is defined as a strategy where practices are rewarded or punished through directing patients 
toward or away from the practice based upon performance scores. Narrow network models are 
often described as being implemented as preferred or limited networks (DST Health, 2018). In 
preferred networks, members can visit any pharmacy but are incentivized through lower cost-
sharing to visit specific pharmacies. In limited networks, members are only allowed to use 
specified pharmacies. Historically, plans have implemented narrow networks for reasons beyond 
quality performance ratings. This paper defines the different models of narrow networks as forms 
of QBN strategies to make the distinction of narrow network models influenced by quality 
performance and not other causes (e.g., contracting agreements).  
 
 
Implementation of VBI Strategies 
 
Utilizing information gathered from conversations with content experts, conference 
presentations, and available literature, 5 distinct examples of the three VBI strategies emerged as 
being considered, if not already implemented, for retail pharmacy. While the VBI “strategy” is 
used to define the three major approaches to achieving higher performance from retail 
pharmacies, VBI “program” will be used to refer to the actual plan or system of action (i.e., 
actual implementation) to achieve such goals (program, 2019). The “bonus payments” program 
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was the only example of a QPO strategy identified. For VBC, two specific examples were 
identified: “DIR fees” and “medication reimbursement adjustment.”  For the QBN strategy, 
“tiered network” and “limited network” programs were identified. A brief description of each 
can be found in Table 1.  
 
 
TABLE 2-1. Description of Five Types of Potential VBI Programs 
VBI Strategy 
Example Programs 
Specific to Strategy 
Description 
Quality 
Payment 
Opportunity 
(QPO) 
 
Bonus Payments Pharmacies receive bonus payments based upon their quality 
performance ratings. VBI programs may differ in the size of 
bonus, eligibility requirements necessary to receive a bonus, 
and intervals between bonus payment distributed.  
 
Value-Based 
Contracting 
(VBC) 
DIR Fee Adjustment Pharmacies are assessed a fee for participating in health plan / 
PBM network for Medicare Part D plans, labeled a DIR fee. 
Typically assessed as a flat fee per-claim or as a flat percentage 
that is assessed at regular intervals. An example VBI program 
may reduce the fee based upon high quality performance 
ratings. 
 
Medication 
Reimbursement 
Adjustment 
 
The total reimbursement to the pharmacy per each prescription 
claim is adjusted based upon pharmacy quality performance 
ratings. This can be achieved either through the actual 
medication reimbursement given to the pharmacy being 
adjusted or the dispensing fee included as part of medication 
reimbursement being adjusted. Adjustments can be either 
increased or lowered, based upon whether higher or lower 
quality performance ratings are achieved. 
 
Quality-Based 
Network  
(QBN) 
Tiered Network Pharmacies in a health plan’s / PBM’s network are classified in 
distinct levels of preference (e.g., "preferred", "non-preferred") 
based upon quality performance ratings. Patients receive 
incentives (e.g., lower copays) for going to "preferred" 
pharmacies instead of "non-preferred" ones. 
 
Limited Network Pharmacies with poor quality performance in a health plan's / 
PBM’s network are excluded from the network. Due to patient 
access considerations, this is not always feasible for all 
pharmacies. 
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Identified VBI Programs 
 The bonus payments VBI program represents the sole example of a QPO strategy 
currently identified as being used with retail pharmacies. For this program, pharmacies are paid a 
bonus based upon their performance on meeting specific goals set by a health plan. The amount 
of bonus provided can range depending on the specific criteria described, with some programs 
distributing single-store bonuses as high as $40,000 per quarter based upon quality metrics (Chan 
& Sega, 2016). Alternatively, some programs may offer only minimal bonuses (e.g., $1,000) 
even for relatively high-performing stores (Deniger, 2015). While the bonus payment program 
was the only example of a QPO strategy identified, there are conceptually other ways a program 
could be developed which reflects a QPO strategy. For example, a pharmacy could be paid an 
additional incentive to provide a service which has been shown to have a beneficial impact on 
performance ratings, such as the implementation of a Med-Sync program (Painter et al., 2015). 
Med-Sync is a pharmacy workflow model designed to help pharmacies better manage patients 
and their prescriptions though monthly appointments and scheduled interactions and has 
demonstrated improvement in adherence for patients (Krumme et al., 2018). 
The first example program of a VBC strategy is adjustment of a pharmacy’s DIR fee. 
DIR fees are well-documented (Balick, 2018; Millonig, 2018) and are already being 
implemented. As alluded to earlier, this “pay to play” fee for network participation can be 
reduced in a DIR fee program if high performance ratings are achieved. For example, if a plan 
typically charges a DIR fee of 3 to 5% of the drug cost for each medication claimed from the 
pharmacy, high performing pharmacies may have their fee reduced to 3% whereas low 
performing pharmacies have to pay the maximum 5% (Moose & Logan, 2016). The second 
example VBC program, medication reimbursement adjustment, refers to the altering of the 
 22 
reimbursement of services or medications for pharmacies based upon performance ratings (Lenz 
& Monaghan, 2011). For example, the dispensing fee or amount of reimbursement associated 
with each medication dispensed from a pharmacy may be adjusted either higher or lower, 
depending on the performance of the pharmacy. While not a well-documented program, there 
appears to be ongoing discussions of how it could be implemented (Lenz & Monaghan, 2011). It 
should be noted both programs are sometimes described simultaneously as “DIR” programs. DIR 
fees can encompass both network participation fees as well as periodic reimbursement 
reconciliations or alternative fees incurred between a retail pharmacy and health plan or PBM 
(NCPA, 2017). While a medication reimbursement adjustment program may fit within such a 
definition, this may unnecessarily create confusion in practice when attempting to refer to one 
program or another. Instead, this paper will distinguish the two programs in definition, allowing 
“DIR fee” to refer solely to network participation fees.  
The VBI programs identified as examples of the QBN strategy generally follow the trend 
set by narrow networks in either being a “preferred” or “limited” network (DST Health, 2018). 
In the former, members can visit any pharmacy but are incentivized to visit specific pharmacies 
through lower-cost sharing at the preferred pharmacy. While often dichotomous (i.e., preferred 
vs. non-preferred), it has been suggested preferred networks could be expanded to include more 
than 2 “tiers” of pharmacies, each with different levels of cost-sharing. In this way, poorly 
performing pharmacies may be penalized by being designated as a “non-preferred” pharmacy 
with higher patient cost-sharing, rather than be excluded from a network. Given this insight, 
instead of utilizing “preferred networks” to describe potential programs which remain open for 
members but have preferred pharmacies, the term “tiered networks” will be used to refer to any 
open network where plans place pharmacies on distinct tiers in order to influence the pharmacies 
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patients utilize. In “limited network” programs, pharmacies may be excluded from a health 
plan’s network for poor performance. While these programs are discussed as being considered 
and implemented (SilverScript, 2014), there are issues which may limit their utilization. For 
example, in rural areas where there are limited pharmacy options, it may difficult to restrict 
patient access to pharmacies by excluding pharmacies, regardless of individual pharmacy 
performance.   
 
Characteristics of VBI Programs 
 Beyond understanding how each VBI program’s structure and outcomes differ, it is also 
important to understand how performance in these programs are evaluated to determine 
outcomes. First, each program must decide on which metrics to utilize to evaluate performance. 
Medicare Part D star rating measures are those most commonly mentioned as being used when 
monitoring and / or making decisions on outcomes associated with VBI programs (Maxwell, 
2015; Bonner, 2016; Jhawar & Rabbitt, 2016; Moose & Logan, 2016). Adherence measures are 
of particular interest for payers, given the continuity of being able to apply them to all retail 
pharmacies. Currently, the three adherence measures included in star ratings are for 
hypertension, diabetes, and cholesterol medications (CMS Star Ratings, 2017). Display measures 
(e.g., avoidance of drug-drug interactions) are mentioned as being monitored but not necessarily 
used in evaluations yet. Additionally, Medicare Part C star rating measures and CAHPS ratings 
are identified as potential measures payers may be monitoring or evaluating as measures of retail 
pharmacy influence.  Other measures which may be monitored by plans include percentage of 
generic products dispense over brand equivalents and number of 90-day supplies dispensed for 
chronic medications (Deniger, 2015). 
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 Once the performance metrics have been decided, a program must then determine how 
the metrics translate into program outcomes. For example, what percent of a store’s patients must 
be adherent to their diabetes medications to receive a bonus? This is generally accomplished 
through one of two performance evaluation methods: “threshold” or “tournament” performance 
measure evaluation (Drug Topics, 2008; Cromwell et al., 2011).  Each type of evaluation can be 
summarized as such: 
• Threshold system: Positive or negative outcomes are based upon whether the pharmacy 
meets specific thresholds (i.e. at least 90% of patients being adherent to oral diabetes 
medications or at least 85% of patients being adherent to all three medication adherence 
quality measures).   
• Tournament system: Positive or negative outcomes are based upon how pharmacies' 
quality performance ratings compare to other pharmacies within a specified network 
within the plan.  In this type of system, the best performing pharmacies would receive the 
highest bonus in a bonus payment program or the lowest fee assessed in a DIR fee 
program.   
Additionally, plans can implement both types of evaluation in determining program outcomes for 
pharmacies. An example would be that all pharmacies that meet a certain threshold are in 
competition for rewards in a bonus payment program. Pharmacies that don't meet the threshold 
are not be eligible for the rewards. 
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Evidence Collected Through Survey 
 
To further supplement anecdotal evidence, an exploratory survey was developed and 
administered to a sample of healthcare plan directors. The survey sought to collect information 
on quality measures being monitored and utilized to influence VBI program outcomes, whether 
select VBI programs had been implemented, and health plan perceptions of select VBI programs.  
The survey’s focus on VBI programs was limited to the programs identified earlier in the paper, 
although respondents were allowed the opportunity to describe other plans or quality measures 
with responses.   
The survey was evaluated and refined by experienced qualitative interview academics as 
well as a pharmaceutical marketing consultant who specializes in qualitative research with 
healthcare plans. Face and content validity of the survey was evaluated through a small sample 
of knowledge experts within the field of pharmacies and Medicare star ratings.  These included 
individuals located in third-party businesses associated with measuring pharmacy performance 
scores and leading researchers in the field. Additionally, a small pretest was conducted with 
policy directors of national and regional health plans to identify any potential issues and ensure 
no meaningful omissions were present in response choices. Only minor changes to the survey 
were incorporated at the conclusion of the pre-test.   
A convenience sample of national health plan directors were recruited through personal 
interactions at two national pharmacy conferences, survey distribution by the Pharmacy Quality 
Alliance (PQA), and available email lists from conference workshops focused on quality 
measures.  Additionally, a snowballing technique was used (Bowling, 1997), where respondents 
were asked to suggest other individuals in separate plans that might also be eligible to participate 
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in the study. Screener questions were included to ensure that only individuals who take part in 
decision-making processes regarding programs directed at improving a plan’s star ratings 
through pharmacies were included in the study. An incentive was provided in the form of an 
executive summary of the study results. A total of 9 individuals met the screener criteria and 
completed some portion of the survey between June to August 2017. While 2 respondents did not 
fully complete the survey, their responses were still included to provide as much information as 
possible on payer perceptions of quality measures and VBI programs. 
In the survey, respondents were asked to rate their perception of perceived effectiveness 
for each of the three VBI strategies to increase quality performance ratings of retail pharmacies 
on a 5-item scale from “not at all effective” to “extremely effective.” For the QPO strategy, 2 
respondents (22%) answered “very effective, 4 (44%) answered “moderately effective”, and 3 
(33%) answered slightly effective. For VBC, 1 (11%) answered “extremely effective”, 1 (11%) 
answered “very effective”, 4 (44%) answered “moderately effective”, 1 (11%) answered slightly 
effective, and 2 (22%) answered “not effective at all.” For QBN, 1 (11%) answered “extremely 
effective”, 3 (33%) answered “moderately effective”, 4 (44%) answered slightly effective, and 1 
(11%) answered “not effective at all.” 
 Survey respondents were also asked to rate their perceptions of effectiveness for the five 
identified VBI programs and likelihood to implement each program to incentivize pharmacies to 
improve quality measure ratings.  A full description of responses can be found in Tables 2 and 3.   
For VBI programs which could conceptually have both a threshold and tournament 
structure implemented (programs associated with QPO and VBC strategies), respondents tended 
to report a higher level of perceived effectiveness with a combination structure over threshold or 
tournament structures alone. A combination approach for the bonus payment programs was rated 
 27 
as moderately effective or better for 63% of respondents, compared to 50% and 38% for 
threshold and tournament structures, respectively. For the DIR fee adjustment program, a 
combination approach was rated as moderately effective or better for 71% of respondents 
compared to 57% and 43% for threshold and tournament structures, respectively. For 
reimbursement adjustment, 57% of respondents perceived moderate effectiveness or better for a 
combination approach compared to 29% and 43% for threshold and tournament structures, 
respectfully. Given the limited approaches to QBN programs, it was decided a combination 
structure would be unlikely and no rating option was given. Between threshold and tournament 
structures for QBN programs, respondents rated higher perceived effectiveness for threshold 
structures for both tiered programs (71% moderately effective or better vs. 57%) and network-
lockout programs (57% vs. 29%).  
Three respondents reported having already implemented at least one VBI program with 
their plans. One health plan had implemented two distinct bonus incentive programs which 
awarded pharmacies a bonus if certain thresholds were met in a given calendar year. Another 
health plan had adopted a tiered network program with a threshold structure, although the 
respondent provided no additional information about the program. The final respondent reported 
a DIR fee adjustment program based upon a threshold-structure as well as a QBN program which 
implemented both a tiered and limited network approach using thresholds. When no program had 
yet been implemented, most respondents rated a higher likelihood to avoid programs associated 
with VBC and QBN strategies compared to the bonus payment program (QPO strategy). 
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Both the 2017 final CMS star ratings as well as draft technical notes for the 2018 CMS 
star ratings were used as a foundation for current and potential quality measures (CMS, 2016; 
CMS, 2017).  The list of measures to include in the survey was refined after conversations with 
industry experts, and additional select CAPHS and other measures were included which were 
noted during information conversations.  A full list of all measures included in the survey, along 
with responses to whether the measures were being monitored and / or used in decision-making, 
are available in Table 4.  
 The measures most reported to being used to influence pharmacy payment and / or 
network decisions included non-insulin diabetes medication adherence (50%), antihypertensive 
medication adherence (38%), cholesterol medication adherence (50%), and percentage of generic 
products dispensed over brand equivalents (50%). Other measures reported to being used to 
influence pharmacy payment and / or network decisions included medication therapy 
management (MTM) program completion rate for comprehensive medication reviews (CMRs), 
antidepressant medication adherence, asthma medication adherence, annual influenza 
vaccination, and number of 90-day supplies dispense for chronic medications. CMS Part D star 
rating active measures and display measures were generally monitored by most respondents. 
Only one CMS Part C stars rating measure was reported to be monitored: administration of the 
pneumococcal vaccine. 
 No respondent reported currently using case-mix adjustment (i.e., factoring in 
sociodemographic information of the patient population the pharmacy serves) for pharmacies 
when evaluating quality performance ratings. When asked the likelihood to adopt case-mix 
adjustment in the future, 2 (29%) reported “probably yes”, 2 (29%) reported “might or might 
not”, 2 (29%) reported “probably not”, and 1 (14%) reported “definitely not.” 
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Discussion of Findings and Implications for Retail Pharmacy 
 
 To date, little research is available which has categorically summarized the types of VBI 
strategies being utilized in retail pharmacy.  Furthermore, this paper attempts to integrate insight 
from pharmacy conferences, literature, and informal conversations with industry experts to 
define specific VBI programs being implemented for each strategy. Additional programs may 
also be under consideration and / or implemented which were not captured by this paper.  
 The VBI programs identified parallel different approaches to trying to change retail 
pharmacy behavior through operant conditioning (McLeod, 2007). Operant conditioning 
proposes a given behavior can be affected by 3 types of responses: reinforcement, punishment, 
and neutral action. Reinforcements attempt to increase the probability of the behavior being 
repeated, punishments attempt to decrease the probability of the behavior being repeated, and 
neutral actions neither attempt to increase or decrease behavior. Furthermore, reinforcements and 
punishments can be classified as either positive or negative, depending on whether a stimulus is 
added (positive) or removed (negative).   
QPO programs are most likely to encompass a type of positive reinforcement where 
pharmacies are positively rewarded with monetary gains for improving quality measure ratings. 
For VBC, programs which impose a DIR fee then offer reductions for high performance ratings 
reflect negative reinforcement; a negative stimulus (i.e. DIR fee) is removed as quality 
performance ratings are improved. Adjustment of medication reimbursement based upon 
performance ratings, dependent upon how implemented, can encompass either positive 
reinforcement or positive punishment or a combination of the two. QBN programs are 
interesting, as they indirectly influence pharmacy revenue via influencing patient behavior. They 
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simultaneously encompass both positive reinforcement and negative punishment techniques.  
Pharmacies with high performance have the potential to gain patients either through being a 
preferred pharmacy or not being excluded from a network (positive reinforcement), whereas 
pharmacies with poor quality performance ratings may have patients directed away from them 
(negative punishment). 
Literature does not provide a resolute answer as to which approach may work best for 
changing pharmacy behavior to strive for higher ratings. Pharmacists’ perception of the reward 
(reinforcement) or punishment would have to be taken into account for each individualized plan. 
While it is outside the scope of this paper to suggest which types of VBI programs may be 
successful using operant conditioning theory, future research should take these principles into 
consideration. 
When considering the specific quality measures and how they are evaluated to determine 
program outcomes, it is interesting that survey respondents appeared to favor evaluating 
performance based on a combination of both the threshold and tournament-based structures, 
rather than standalone approaches. Combination approaches do allow for more flexibility in how 
rewards and punishments are determined. As previously described, a plan could set a threshold at 
which all pharmacies above the threshold would receive a bonus payment. However, the bonus 
payment may be dependent on comparison to quality ratings achieved by other pharmacies above 
the threshold. A minimum bonus could be set while allowing for the option to gain more based 
upon network performance. This would incentive pharmacies to hit a minimum threshold for 
bonus payments while rewarding those who strive to achieve more. Even for VBC programs this 
flexibility may allow unique ways to incentivize retail pharmacy. 
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It makes sense survey respondents would favor a threshold-structure for QBN programs 
rather than a tournament structure. Plans are likely limited in how they can even implement QBN 
programs based upon how it affects pharmacy access for their plan members. Setting minimum 
thresholds to achieve not being locked out of a network or being considered a “preferred” 
pharmacy are easier to be implemented and more consistent than tournament systems, which 
would change pharmacy standings within the network in regular intervals. 
While not fully described in this paper, many of the identified programs can be 
conceptually tied together to form more complex programs. For example, a plan may implement 
a single program where pharmacies are given the choice to participate in a DIR fee program 
while excluding non-participating pharmacies from the network or designating them as a “non-
preferred” pharmacy with higher patient co-pays associated with the pharmacy. Similarly, QPO 
programs could be combined with VBC programs in unique ways such as reducing DIR fees if 
certain quality rating thresholds are met while also offering bonuses based upon quality 
performance comparisons to other pharmacies within the network. Much more research is 
necessary to understand the many different programs being considered and implemented to 
incentivize higher quality performance ratings from retail pharmacy.  
 As would generally be expected, plans appear to be closely following CMS Part D star 
ratings for measures associated with retail pharmacy practice.  Part D measures are those most 
closely related to pharmacy practice and it intuitively makes sense they would be the primary 
conduit by which VBI programs are implemented.  Some plans may be following display 
measures closer than others, attempting to potentially set baselines for measurement and 
preparing for if the measures become active. While few Part C star ratings were noted to be 
monitored, other plans may be utilizing closer partnerships with retail pharmacies within their 
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network to help improve these ratings. Additionally, some plans appear to be considering 
additional quality measures beyond CMS star ratings. One survey respondent reported utilizing 
adherence measures for antidepressants and asthma medications, which are measures in the 
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) used to evaluate commercial health 
plans. Other plans are similarly looking to other ways retail pharmacy can help improve the 
quality of care provided toward their patients. 
 One interesting finding is plans are utilizing measures other than star ratings or other 
nationally accepted quality measures. Multiple survey respondents reported using the number of 
90-day supplies dispensed for chronic medications and the percentage of generic products 
dispensed over generic equivalents as influencing pharmacy payment (e.g., bonuses, DIR fees) or 
network decisions. Research by Matlin et al. (2015) suggest 90-day prescriptions result in better 
patient adherence over filling 30-day supplies. However, others contend health plans’ inclusion 
of 90-day supplies as a quality measure is primarily driven by financial incentives to do so 
(Deniger, 2016). Similarly, research suggests generic fills are associated with greater patient 
adherence (Briesacher et al., 2009). In some instances, such as narrow-spectrum diseases like 
epilepsy where changing a patient’s prescription may de-stabilize control of the disease, pushing 
for medication switches (i.e., brand to generic) may actually cause harm to a patient. Measures 
such as these will need to be carefully implemented to avoid such situations.  
 
 
Limitations 
 
A few cautions should be taken into consideration for the present paper.  First, while 
references were ascribed where possible, the informal nature of how information was gathered 
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results in some of the paper relying on the authors’ personal experiences. Additional research is 
certainly warranted to confirm the paper’s findings and conclusions. However, the 
categorizations of VBI strategies may still serve as a basis for discussions of potential ways 
health plans may pursue in developing and implementing VBI programs. Second, the survey 
responses should only serve to provide insight instead of developing conclusions for how health 
plans are pursuing higher quality ratings from retail pharmacy. This limitation should already be 
expected but a word of caution is still warranted. The limited sample size and convenience 
sampling technique used for the survey exacerbates this issue through sampling biases which are 
likely present, including nonresponse bias.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Although awareness and knowledge of quality measures and VBI programs is growing, 
there is still a lack of comprehensive understanding of the programs being considered and 
implemented by health plans. This paper provides a categorization of potential VBI strategies 
being employed and presents anecdotal evidence of the associated VBI programs being 
considered and implemented. Much more research is necessary to fully understand the variety 
and complexity of programs being implemented.  Doing so benefits multiple stakeholders, 
including pharmacists, policy makers, researchers, and even health plans seeking to gain insight 
into how to best adapt to the changing environment. Furthermore, understanding the broad scope 
of programs being implemented now helps to direct conversations to how they can be improved 
and foster creative discussion on new programs which may be developed. As VBI programs 
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continue to evolve and reshape the focus of retail pharmacy, so too will research need to be 
directed at shedding light into these changes.  
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CHAPTER 3: RETAIL PHARMACY’S ATTITUDES ON QUALITY MEASURES AND 
POTENTIAL HEALTH PLAN VALUE-BASED INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the 
one that is the most adaptable to change.” – Leon Megginson (1963) 
 
 The above quote, in reference to works by Charles Darwin, is often the inspiration behind 
one of the more recognized idioms in the world of business: “Adapt or die” (McCallum, 2001), 
which implies that it is those who strive to constantly change to account for the shifting business 
environment that are able to remain sustainable. Examples of businesses that have not heeded 
this philosophy, and were consequently forced to close, include Kodak (Mui, 2012), Blockbuster 
(Satell, 2014), and Borders Books (Sansburn, 2001). For the field of healthcare, pharmacy 
managers may also be facing a period of environmental shift that requires attention and the 
adaptation of pharmacy practices to survive. 
 In 2014, the Affordable Care Act began providing bonus payments to Medicare 
healthcare plans based upon quality performance measurements (HLMedit, 2014). These 
payments are part of a larger shift in reimbursements from traditional fee-for-service (FFS) to 
quality or value-based models (DHHS, 2015). The various Medicare quality performance 
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measurements make up what is known as the Medicare Star Ratings, a system whereby plans are 
rated from 1 star to 5 stars, with 5 stars denoting the highest quality.  Plans with at least 4 stars 
are eligible to receive bonus payments (Jacobson et al., 2011).  In response to this healthcare 
plans have begun to consider ways to maximize their star ratings to receive these bonus 
payments.  Data suggest many performance measurements, particularly those related to Medicare 
Part D, can be highly impacted by pharmacies (Erickson et al., 2014). As such, plans are now 
evaluating how to prompt pharmacies to increase quality and in turn boost their own 
performance measures (Stolpe, 2015). 
 Recently, reports have begun to surface detailing different value-based incentive (VBI) 
programs being implemented by health plans and PBMs to incentivize pharmacies to boost 
pharmacy-related quality performance ratings.  One plan incentivizes pharmacies used by their 
beneficiaries by offering bonus payments to the pharmacies themselves based upon the 
performance measurements (IEHP, 2016). Another has warned pharmacies within their network 
they will stop providing reimbursements for patients visiting their pharmacy if their performance 
measure ratings are too low (SilverScript, 2014). Additional reports have described how some 
plans are incentivize pharmacies through reduction of fees required for a pharmacy to participate 
in a health plan’s network (i.e., “pay-to-play” fees, also known as DIR fees) (Maxwell, 2015; 
Moose & Logan, 2016).   
 As such, pharmacy owners and managers are certainly interested in understanding how 
they might be impacted by these new reimbursement models.  Monitoring systems, such as the 
Electronic Quality Improvement Platform for Plans & Pharmacies (EQUiPP) that help 
pharmacies measure and understand their own performance scores have recently gained 
popularity (EQuIPP, 2016).  This system provides data on individual store performance scores as 
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well as provides organizational, statewide, and national comparisons.  Additionally, reports and 
discussions on how pharmacies might adapt to the changing environment have been presented at 
various national pharmacy meetings (Maxwell, 2015; Moose & Logan, 2016). However, little 
research has gathered feedback from members of the retail pharmacy community, to whom VBI 
programs are directed, regarding their perceptions of quality measures and associated VBI 
programs. 
The following study sought to understand the perceptions of knowledgeable retail 
pharmacy managers regarding quality measures, VBI programs, and their impact on retail 
pharmacy practice. Using managerial cognition theory, the study proposes to understand 
pharmacy managers’ awareness, evaluation, and actions in response to the increasing pressure to 
maximize performance measurements.  Additionally, the study will seek to uncover pharmacy 
managers’ attitudes and perceptions of potential VBI programs used by healthcare plans. 
 
  
Methods 
 
The research was conducted using qualitative interviews. A semi-structured interview 
approach was taken with managers or other pharmacy employees whose job responsibilities 
included understanding quality measures and helped determine how their pharmacy(ies) should 
react.  
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Interview Guide 
 The interview guide was developed around Meterko et al.’s (2006) conceptual framework 
of provider attitudes to pay-for-performance incentive programs.  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
designate for a manager to be aware and engage in information seeking to act upon external 
events, the manager must first consider the external event important.  To understand this, 
multiple dimensions of how a provider might react to uncertainty in the environment (e.g., VBI 
programs) is necessary.  
The framework, conceptualized by Meterko et al. (2006), suggests incentive program 
characteristics, environment characteristics (e.g., culture of the work environment, resources 
available), and provider characteristics influence a provider’s attitudes towards the incentive 
program.  The framework also states provider attitudes are made up of many different 
dimensions affecting providers’ behaviors toward seeking to achieve quality targets of incentive 
programs. Evidence suggesting convergent and discriminant validity has been observed for the 
model.  
The framework’s theoretical dimensions are comparable to those engendered in the 
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1985). For example, attitude dimensions of 
awareness and understanding, clinical relevance, and financial salience might reflect the overall 
attitudinal dimension of TPB.  Additionally, cooperation from other colleagues might reflect 
normative beliefs of TPB, with control over resources needed to achieve quality targets reflecting 
perceived control of TPB. While Meterko et al.’s framework has much less empirical evidence 
and support compared to TPB, Meterko et al.’s framework was selected as the foundation for 
constructs to test when interviewing pharmacists due to its specific application in describing 
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health provider decision-making, particularly relating to meeting quality targets and reacting to 
performance measurements. 
Specific attitudinal dimensions chosen to be tested include awareness and understanding 
of VBI programs, financial salience, clinical relevance, perceived impact, control, and 
cooperation. To provide context to discussion of VBI programs and attitudes surrounding them, 
three types of programs were reviewed with respondents: 1) pay-for-performance models, 2) 
value-based contracting models, and 3) quality-based networks.  Demographic data of the 
individuals were captured, along with information-gathering sources and use of evaluation 
systems (i.e. EQuIPP).  The interview guide was refined through multiple rounds of evaluation 
and critique by experienced qualitative interview academics. Additionally, a small convenience 
sample of two pharmacy managers were recruited to pre-test the guide to test face and content 
validity. Both respondents reported no issues with the guide and so no additional changes were 
made. 
 
Sample 
 A total of 15 pharmacists were recruited through a purposive sampling approach. An 
initial sample of 15 pharmacists was chosen with the possibility for additional interviews if 
saturation was not met within the initial set of interviews. To account multiple viewpoints within 
community pharmacy practice, a minimum of 5 large chain drug stores and 10 independent 
pharmacies were recruited. For those within the large chain retail setting members of upper level 
management, who were more informed of broad-level decision-making, were targeted instead of 
managers of individual pharmacies or district managers. For independent pharmacies, owners of 
the pharmacy or those in charge of managing the pharmacy(ies) associated with the independent 
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practice were targeted. Potential candidates were identified through the Association of Managed 
Care Pharmacy (AMCP) annual conference and through various pharmacy organizations, 
including Health Mart, the nation’s largest pharmacy services administrative organization 
(PSAO) for independent pharmacies (McKesson, 2014).  Potential participants were screened to 
determine they were aware of quality measures and VBI programs and to determine if their job 
responsibilities included assessment and responding to pharmacy quality performance measures 
on behalf of the pharmacy.  Additionally, a snowballing technique was used to identify 
additional respondents. Interviews were conducted through scheduled 45-minute telephone calls. 
 
Analysis 
 All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  Transcriptions of the interviews were 
analyzed using thematic content analysis (Grbich, 1999).  This type of analysis involves the 
broad categorization of interview responses, with further sub-categorizations defined as coding 
of the interviews occurs.  Braun & Clark’s (2006) six-phase framework was used as the basis for 
conducting the content analysis.  All transcripts were first read, then initial codes generated 
which consolidated text relevant to one of the 6 themes pre-designated from Meterko et al.’s 
framework. Sub-themes were then developed, refined through multiple reviews of the text, and 
eventually defined for the purposes of the study.    
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Results 
 
Interviews took place from August 2016 to April 2017.  A point of saturation, where no 
additional information emerged from respondents, was met once the initial 15 interviews were 
complete, so no additional pharmacies were sought. Interviews ranged from 34 minutes to 58 
minutes in length, with an average time of 44 minutes. Demographic data for respondents are 
available in Table 1.  All chain pharmacies captured within the study owned at least 50 
pharmacies within their organization. For independent pharmacies, both single stores as well as 
multiple store businesses were represented, with two respondents representing at least 6 stores 
within their business. The Midwest census region was the most represented U.S. region by 
respondents, with 10 (66.7%) respondents having stores located within the region. Conversely, 
the West was the least represented, with only 3 (20%) respondents having stores located within 
the region. 
Table 3-1. Respondent Demographics 
  Pharmacists 
(n=15) 
  % (no.) 
Gender Male 80% 12 
Female 20% 3 
    
Time Spent as a Pharmacist Less than 1 year 0% 0 
2 to 3 years 6.7% 1 
4 to 10 years 0% 0 
11 to 20 years 46.7% 7 
Over 20 years 46.7% 7 
    
Number of Pharmacy 
Stores Within Business 
1 26.7% 4 
2 to 5 26.7% 4 
6 to 20 13.3% 2 
21 to 50 0% 0 
Over 50 33.3% 5 
    
Census Region(s) Where 
Pharmacy Store(s) Located 
West 20% 3 
Midwest 66.7% 10 
South 53.3% 8 
Northeast 26.7% 4 
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 Twelve themes were identified from each of the concepts outlined in Meterko et al.’s 
framework. In the following section, each theme will be discussed under the category it most 
resembles. 
 
Awareness and Understanding 
This category was associated with two themes. First, respondents felt very aware and 
knowledgeable of star rating measures and the VBI programs health plans were implementing to 
incentivize higher ratings. Respondents reported they kept informed as possible to appropriately 
prepare their pharmacy, with one respondent stating, “We are trying to do our best to educate 
our staff and our people on what our plans are doing to try to plan for the future.”   
The second theme was associated with a desire for more transparency in health-plan 
sponsored VBI programs, specifically in how thresholds and rewards / fees were calculated. In 
particular, the pharmacists believed they were not provided enough information to consistently 
predict the amount of reward received (e.g., pay-for-performance) or fee assessed (e.g., DIR fee) 
based on their pharmacies’ ratings.  One respondent expressed their frustration in the perceived 
lack of transparency, stating, “As far as the methodologies that [health plans] use it's very, very 
confusing.  I've probably taken an extensive time to try to research it and ask different sources 
and try to remain as objective as possible.  As much as anybody can understand it, I attempt to 
learn but it is difficult.  It's very, very difficult.  I think it's that by design.” 
 
Clinical Relevance 
The themes of overall good for patients, further development is needed, and overall 
good for the profession of pharmacy were identified for clinical relevance.  Respondents 
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believed quality measures helped create better patient engagement through promotion of better 
identification of and intervention with at-risk patients (e.g., those with poor adherence). One 
respondent stated, “I think it’s incredibly good for patients.  As much work and as much 
headache as all of this creates for me as an owner, for trying to account for the lesser 
reimbursements and the trouble that we’re having financially with all of that change – to me, the 
patient does stand to benefit greatly from this new model.”   
However, respondents also wished to see further development of measures and programs 
to ensure the right approaches were being taken to provide quality care for patients.  One 
respondent posed the question, “Are we chasing the right things for quality? That will become 
the bigger question as we go forward. Right now, there are flaws with measuring adherence. We 
use claims data. Just because somebody pays for something doesn’t mean they are actually 
going to take it.”  
Many respondents also expressed a desire for more direct collaboration with health plans 
for individual patients and having VBI programs more directly tied to patient outcomes (e.g., 
reduction in A1C for diabetic patients).  One respondent described a collaborative pilot program 
within their state they would like to see more of from plans in the future: “Our pharmacists will 
be assigned to patients at the beginning of the calendar year and they will follow those patients 
for an entire year and the plan is supplying clinical data to our pharmacist through a portal. It is 
a pilot right now. The pharmacist will be incentivized based on being able to lower A1C, for 
[improving] blood pressure, and for asthma related measures. There will be a payment just for 
the intervention, like there would for any MTM, but the incentive payment for the outcomes is 
huge compared to what a normal MTM would reimburse.”   
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Regardless, all respondents agreed quality measures and VBI programs are positive for 
the profession of pharmacy, as they readjust the focus of pharmacy practice from being 
“transaction-based” to individual patient care, push pharmacies to play a larger role in patients’ 
healthcare, and open the door for better relationships with both patients and other providers. One 
respondent suggested, “We’re going to work ourselves to irrelevancy if we focus on product only 
and this is a good impetus to push the practice of pharmacy in the direction it needs to go,” 
while another stated, “It's going to make collectively us strive to do a better job.” Another simply 
said, “This is why you went to school be a pharmacist.” 
 
Perceived Impact 
Three themes were identified related to perceived impact: two associated with impact to 
the pharmacy, significant impact to how pharmacy is practiced and significant resources 
required, and one associated with impact to the patient, positive impact on patient health.  In 
an effort to improve quality measure ratings, respondents reported they have re-evaluated and 
altered how they approach engaging with patients.  All respondents have adapted to using 
EQuiPP to track their ratings, with many also implementing their own internal system systems of 
measurement to help identify patients with poor adherence. Some pharmacies have implemented 
more proactive patient engagement structures, such as Med-Sync: a pharmacy workflow model 
designed to help pharmacies better manage patients and their prescriptions though monthly 
appointments and scheduled interactions (Painter et al., 2015).  
Other pharmacies have even altered the pharmacy structure itself to provide a better 
“counseling” area or room where more comprehensive discussions with patients can take place. 
To this end, one respondent stated, “We have to transition to where we are more accessible to 
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the patients and that, in turn, will increase your quality ratings.” One respondent stated that 
pharmacy practice has traditionally been “set up to be a transactional thing: get them in and get 
them out as fast as you can.” They also stated pharmacy is shifting, due to quality measures, to 
require a more “relational component. Pharmacists need to have a system and a process in place 
that they are making the most of working with a patient.”  
 To accommodate these changes, respondents argued the need for pharmacies to invest 
significant resources.  Respondents mentioned needing to spend time to reevaluate and 
implement new processes, reallocating pharmacist and / or technician time, and purchasing and 
learning new technology (e.g., software) to assist in improving ratings.  In adapting to shifting 
practice patterns, one respondent stated trouble with “finding the time, that's the biggest thing.  
Also identifying a workflow, workflow that accommodates both a clinical initiative and still 
having to dispense and fill prescriptions at the same time.”  Additionally, respondents noted the 
need to educate pharmacy staff on the importance of quality measures as well as devoting time 
and other resources to remaining aware of any and all changes in the environment which may 
affect their practice(s) (e.g., new quality measures).  
 Despite the significant changes and resources required, respondents believed quality 
measures generally result in a positive impact on patient health. Respondents reported better 
overall care was being provided to their patients due to a focus on improving quality measure 
ratings, with one respondent stating, “at the end of the day we have greater pharmacy 
engagement with patients related to their medication therapy, which is always a positive thing.”  
Furthermore, respondents believed they could see the positive impact on patients whom had been 
intervened on due to trying to improve ratings. One respondent described the benefit for patients 
by saying, “We know driving better adherence certainly leads to healthier patients which then 
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keeps them out of the hospital and lowers healthcare costs, overall. Everybody wins in that 
arena. I think it is extremely important.” 
 
Control 
Two themes emerged related to the Control category.  First, respondents believed 
pharmacists have enough control in patient interactions to affect quality measures. 
Respondents reported at least at a basic level, the choice of pharmacists to intervene with patients 
will have an overall positive effect on outcomes such as medication adherence and patient health. 
One attributed the ability of the pharmacist to affect quality measures through pharmacists “still 
having the trust of the public... as the experts on medications” and “accessibility, because we’re 
in the community, we’re here, they can call us up at any time – that is what kind of sets us apart, 
I feel like, from other healthcare professionals.” Most respondents felt the shift to deeper patient 
engagement has led or can lead to greater response of patients to pharmacist intervention, with 
one stating “We've seen it here by solving problems for patients, fixing gaps in care that they've 
got.” 
However, it was quickly noted this is not true for every patient, as each patient is 
ultimately responsible for their own healthcare. One respondent voiced their frustration saying, 
“I have some hard headed customers, they are going to do it the way they want to do it 
regardless. That negatively affects me and my score when I can’t make that person do [what they 
need to].” Respondents pointed out how some pharmacies may contend with a higher prevalence 
of patients who do not respond to pharmacist intervention, which resulted in discussion of the 
second theme: a need for community-level adjustments.  For example, quality performance 
ratings of pharmacies located in communities with a large percentage of patients with poor 
 51 
adherence could be slightly adjusted to account for the inherent adherence issues which may be 
beyond the control of the pharmacist (i.e., risk-adjustment). One respondent stated, “I think it is 
going to be necessary, particularly if we want to go to the next level with star measures in 
looking at some sort of composite quality rating. You are definitely going to have to consider risk 
adjustment.” 
 
Cooperation 
Two themes were associated with Cooperation. The first theme, a good opportunity for 
cooperation, reflected sentiment that, in general, respondents felt quality measures provided a 
chance for pharmacists to facilitate better working relationships with other health professionals.  
However, actual experiences varied greatly between respondents. One respondent stated, “The 
collaboration piece is very important, and I think that's where healthcare is kind of moving.  The 
problem is getting the physician or the other parts of the healthcare team to recognize 
pharmacists as a peer because right now we're working against in the way pharmacy is 
perceived, and that's as dispensers.” Most respondents who had positive interactions with other 
health professionals reported it was due to proactively developing collaborative relationships and 
the successful demonstration of the quality of care provided to patients through the pharmacy.  
The second theme identified was pharmacists’ desire for better technology to interact 
with other health professionals. Respondents felt technology which facilitated better 
communication between health professionals could allow pharmacists to continue building 
relationships with other health professionals and establishing pharmacists as integral members of 
the healthcare team.  For example: access to electronic medical records (EMR). One respondent 
described their desire for pharmacists “[to be] able to look and see adherence scores on the 
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patients so they can actually see real-time how the patients are doing, and then how we can see 
and look and see how they're doing at their clinic visits, you know, if the changes we're making 
for better adherence are actually affecting the patients' blood pressure, affecting their 
cholesterol scores, just seeing that changes we're making are actually having a difference, and 
then so providers can also see that the patients are actually taking their medications.  If they're 
not, then they might want to know that data so then they aren't falsely increasing their blood 
pressure medication.” Respondents believed this would not only facilitate better cooperation 
with health professionals, but also result in a more comprehensive approach to patient care.  
 
Financial Salience 
 One primary theme was prevalent throughout discussion regarding the perceived 
financial salience of quality measures: current VBI programs do not adequately incentivize 
pharmacies to achieve high quality measure ratings. Most respondents felt current VBI 
programs fell short in the rewards provided for achieving high ratings, such as through the 
amount of reward received through programs which provide bonuses for high performance. 
Another example given was the perceived insufficient reward associated with reducing the 
required network participation fee (i.e., DIR fee) by achieving high performance. Given the 
perceived need to expend additional resources to achieve higher quality ratings, respondents felt 
current programs did not adequately reward the effort to achieve high ratings, or that only few 
pharmacies were able to achieve sufficient reward. One respondent summarized general 
sentiment best by stating, “I don’t know of any [VBI program] I like. I would say that we are 
probably still moving towards that formula that works best and aligns incentives as we go 
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forward. I don’t have any idea what the timeline is for us to see that. It is out there, and we will 
get closer to it, at least.” 
Programs which provided more of a “stick” approach, such as implementing a DIR fee 
and decreasing the level of fee with higher ratings, were viewed negatively and as only 
motivating pharmacies due to a fear of losing money. One respondent stated, “You're not trying 
to actually beat or exceed anything.  You're not trying to be first in the class, you're just trying 
not to fail,” a sentiment reflected by several respondents that punishing programs only motivated 
a minimal effort to not have poor ratings.  Still, respondents were willing to pursue higher ratings 
in the hope achieving higher ratings would, in the future, result in rewards commensurate with 
the effort.   
 
 
Discussion 
 
 The results of the study capture the perspectives of pharmacists actively engaged in 
understanding and adapting to pharmacy-related quality measures and the programs being 
implemented by health plans to incentive higher ratings. Fifteen pharmacy managers 
representing both large chain retail as well as independent retail pharmacies were interviewed. 
Under the pre-designed themes from Meterko et a.’s framework of awareness and understanding, 
clinical relevance, perceived impact, control, cooperation, and financial salience, 12 subthemes 
were identified from interviews. While several concerns were voiced regarding the resources 
required and change necessary to achieve high ratings, the sample generally favored the impact 
of quality measures on the profession of pharmacy and the quality of care provided to patients. 
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These results match those of other studies which also captured positive overall positive attitudes 
of pharmacists to the implementation of quality ratings (Teeter et al., 2016) 
 Given the study recruited pharmacists with responsibilities associated with understanding 
and helping adapt their pharmacies to quality measure ratings, it comes as no surprise the sample 
was knowledgeable about current measures and those being discussed for future implementation 
(i.e., display measures). Despite the desire for the pharmacists to fully understand their 
environment, especially the VBI programs being implemented within their own pharmacies, the 
perceived lack of transparency associated with VBI programs is of concern. In particular, this 
appears to be a missed opportunity for health plans to better motivate pharmacies through a clear 
articulation of program incentives.  As stated by several of the respondents, closer collaboration 
between pharmacists and health plans on development and implementation of VBI programs in 
the future may also help bridge this gap in communication.  
 As pharmacists form opinions of quality measures and VBI programs, the ethical 
obligation of pharmacists to focus on the well-being of their patients is likely to play a prominent 
role in the formation of their overall attitudes. Therefore, it is important for pharmacists to be 
able to perceive a clinical relevance in quality measures before they are willing to seek 
improving their own ratings. The study participants largely voiced their approval of quality 
measures in this way. This is further exemplified through positive attitudes regarding how 
pharmacists perceived the profession evolving due to quality measures and VBI programs.  
While there was a clear perception of clinical relevance, several barriers were noted by 
respondents which may or may not be able to be addressed as quality measures and VBI 
programs continue to evolve.  While most respondents believed pharmacists had enough control 
to significantly impact pharmacy-related quality measures (e.g., adherence measures), a desire 
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for ratings to take into account community-level variables (i.e., risk-adjustment) was prominent. 
Currently, no quality measures or display measures include risk-adjustment, and it is unclear 
how much health plans employ risk-adjustment in their own calculations of ratings.  
The respondents’ desire to cooperate more closely with health plans may also suggest an 
indirect feeling of lack of control related to performance programs.  Pharmacists may not get to 
contribute much feedback to the development or implementation of VBI programs. Many may 
only get to choose how to react instead of proactively engaging with plans to develop mutually 
agreed upon approaches.  Feelings of lack of control may also manifest in cooperation received 
from other health professionals. For example, some pharmacists may face barriers when 
attempting to work with other health professionals to achieve higher quality ratings for patients 
(e.g., getting prescription changed to resolve an issue causing poor adherence for the patient).  
Further research is necessary to understand how perceptions of control may affect the intended 
behavior of pharmacists in meeting and / or exceeding quality measure targets. 
The perceived lack of financial salience is consistent with emerging research on VBI 
programs (NCPA, 2018). Coupled with pharmacists’ perceived impact on resources (e.g., time, 
money) to adapt to quality measures, pharmacists’ overall intention to try to achieve high ratings 
may be dampened over time. No previous research has analyzed the impact of financial 
incentives on pharmacist attitudes of behavior compared to other constructs such as subjective 
norms or perceived professional obligation. Furthermore, it is too soon to determine whether 
attitudes of lacking financial incentive will even remain given the currently evolving nature of 
VBI programs. As new programs are developed and existing ones adjusted, health plans and 
researchers may wish to evaluate the long-term impact of financial salience and resource 
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investment required to how motivated pharmacists are to achieve and sustain high quality 
ratings.   
 
 
Limitations 
 
As with all qualitative research, several limitations are worth noting. First, respondents 
may have been subject to providing socially desirable answers in their responses (i.e., social 
desirability bias). The study sought to minimalize this bias by building rapport with respondents 
through informal communication prior to interviews. Additionally, respondents were assured 
there were no right or wrong answers and informed of possible dissenting views to ensure 
truthful answers were given. Finally, the primary investigator attempted to probe when 
hesitations were present in respondent answers or when discrepancies occurred within the 
interview. For example, when respondents appeared vocally negative about quality measures but 
stated they believed they were positive for the profession of pharmacy, their responses were 
queried further to gain better understanding of respondent perceptions and ensure consistency of 
responses.       
Second, respondents may have been subject to a choice-supportive bias within their 
responses. This is the tendency for respondents to ascribe a positive attribute to a previous choice 
made by an individual (Mather et al., 2000). The pharmacists had all committed some level of 
resources to adapting to quality measures, even if just regularly reviewing EQuIPP scores, 
meaning there is a higher likelihood for desiring validation for their actions. To minimize this 
bias, respondents were asked to present both the opportunities and challenges associated with 
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quality measures and VBI programs in a balanced approach. However, respondents were fairly 
open in responses and were very willing to discuss challenges currently present, despite their 
committal to adapting to quality measures. 
The third limitation which may be present is related to the subjective interpretation of 
qualitative research.  The interview guide attempted to keep questions straightforward to 
facilitate clear answers from respondents, reducing the likelihood for responses to be mis-
interpreted. Furthermore, the author re-reviewed themes multiple times once identified to ensure 
consistency in interpretation to responses.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The present study suggests pharmacists who are actively engaged in understanding and 
responding to star rating measures and VBI programs have generally positive attitudes toward 
the evolving pharmacy environment.  Opportunity exists for health plans and pharmacists to 
work together to address adjust quality measure ratings and further develop VBI programs which 
better align clinical relevance with financial salience and account for perceived pharmacist 
control.  Additional research is necessary to fully understand the relationships between 
pharmacist attitudes of star ratings and VBI programs to behavioral intention to adapt pharmacy 
practices to achieve high ratings.  
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CHAPTER 4: ESTIMATING THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF POTENTIAL MEDICARE 
VALUE-BASED INCENTIVE PROGRAMS ON RETAIL PHARMACY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Value-based incentive (VBI) models of healthcare are quickly becoming an integral part 
of how healthcare is funded in the United States. Since 2010, the Star Rating system provides 
bonuses to Medicare Advantage (MA) and Medicare Advantage with Part D (MA-PD) plans 
based upon a set of quality performance measures for Part C and Part D services (Galewitz, 
2016; Jacobson et al., 2011). Medicare Star Ratings performance measurements for Part D 
include adherence scores for three medication classes: oral anti-diabetics, renin-angiotensin-
aldosterone system agents, and cholesterol medications (CMS Star Ratings, 2016). Community 
pharmacies are in a prime position to help improve overall adherence scores for plans, as 
literature supports the positive effect retail pharmacists can have on patient medication adherence 
(Lee at al., 2006; Murray et al., 2007). Furthermore, pharmacies are in a position to influence 
other Star Rating performance measures, such as provision of medication therapy management 
(MTM) services and annual vaccinations (CMS Star Ratings, 2016).  The multiple direct and 
indirect ways pharmacies can impact Star Ratings, which were previously estimated to be as high 
as 19% of Part C star ratings and 54% of Part D ratings (Erickson et al., 2014), have caused 
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healthcare plans to begin implementation of VBI programs for incentivizing pharmacies to 
engage in improving performance scores (SilverScript, 2014; IEHP, 2016). 
Given the relative infancy of these programs in community pharmacy, it comes as no 
surprise information is limited on the programs being considered and implemented by health 
plans. Available anecdotal information suggests multiple distinct ways in which the dynamic 
between pharmacies and health plans are changing (Rawal et al., 2015).  Some plans have begun 
implementing bonus payment programs, whereby pharmacies who achieve distinct thresholds of 
performance scores or are among the highest performing stores in their network receive bonus 
payments from the health plan (IEHP, 2016).  In some programs, pharmacies’ fee to participate 
in the network is affected by quality measures (Balick, 2018), while others are discussing 
adjustment of medication reimbursement or dispensing fees based on performance scores (Lenz 
& Monaghan, 2011).  A few plans have considered completely removing low-performing 
pharmacies from their networks (Maxwell, 2015; Moose & Logan, 2016).   
In addition to only limited information available on implemented programs, there is even 
less information on the financial impact these programs are having on community pharmacies. 
One case report lists the financial impact of a single bonus payment VBI program on the 
pharmacy as being $1,190 in bonus payments (Deniger, 2015). This is a reflection of achieving 
adherence performance scores higher than the 5-star benchmark in two out of the three adherence 
measures.  The pharmacy in question was considered a medium-size pharmacy, filling 
approximately 250 to 350 prescriptions per day.  While the report gives a glimpse of how 
pharmacies might be impacted, further research is necessary to fully comprehend the financial 
impact VBI programs will have on retail pharmacy. 
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 The purpose of the study was to evaluate potential VBI programs health plans might 
implement for community pharmacies in their network. For multiple stakeholders, including 
individual store managers, the study provides insight into how potential programs may 
financially impact community pharmacies.    
  
 
Methods 
 
A retrospective study was conducted using 2016 Mississippi Medicare administrative 
claims data to compute pharmacy performance scores and estimate the impact of potential payer 
VBI programs.  The study was approved by The University of Mississippi Institutional Review 
Board (IRB).  
 
Data Source 
Mississippi Medicare claims data were made available as de-identified files for the 
calendar year of 2016.  Encrypted IDs for beneficiaries and pharmacy stores were utilized to link 
data between files.  Use of these data was covered by a data use agreement (DUA) between The 
University of Mississippi’s Centers for Pharmaceutical Marketing and Management (CPMM) 
and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 
 
Pharmacy Performance Measurement 
 Pharmacy performance was operationalized as the percentage of Medicare patients 
associated with a given pharmacy who met criteria to be defined as “adherent” to a subset of 
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medication adherence measures. The calculations predominantly reflect methodology for the 
three triple-weighted adherence measures used in star ratings for the following diseases: diabetes 
mellitus, hypertension, and cholesterol (CMS Star Ratings, 2015). Therapy classes comprising 
the diabetes measure included biguanides, sulfonylureas, thiazolidinediones (TZDs), DPP-IV 
inhibitors, incretin mimetics, meglitinides, and SGLT2 inhibitors. The hypertension measure was 
comprised of renin angiotensin system (RAS) antagonists, including angiotensin converting 
enzyme inhibitors (ACEI), angiotensin receptor blockers (ARBs), or direct renin inhibitors. The 
cholesterol measure was comprised of HMG-CoA inhibitors, otherwise known as “statins”. 
Combination therapies containing any of the eligible active ingredients were also included in 
measure calculations. 
 The first step included calculating the medication adherence for each Medicare patient 
across the three adherence measures.  Proportion of days covered (PDC) was used to calculate 
adherence for eligible patients. The PDC is calculated as the percent of days in the measurement 
period accounted for by prescription claims for the same medication or medications contained 
within the same therapeutic category (CMS Star Ratings, 2015).  A patient was defined as 
“adherent” for each measure if they achieved a PDC of ≥0.8 (i.e., patient was covered by 
medication claims for at least 80% of the measurement period). Each patient’s measurement 
period was defined as the period beginning on the date of the first prescription of the calendar 
year and ending on the last day of the year, the last day covered by the final prescription if not 
covered until the end of the year, or date of patient’s death. Prescription data from mail-order 
pharmacies was not included in the analysis, as it is not typically available to be utilized in CMS 
Star Ratings. 
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 Eligible patients included those who were 18 years or older (as measured by the last day 
of the measurement year) with at least two fills of medication(s) across any of the drug classes 
during the measurement period. Patients were also only included in the measure calculation if the 
first fill of their medication occurred at least 91 days before the end of the enrollment period. 
Patients with ESRD coverage dates were excluded as is consistent with star rating adherence 
measures. In addition to these requirements, two adherence-specific exclusions were included. 
For the diabetes adherence measure, patients with one or more fills for insulin were excluded 
from the denominator. For the hypertension adherence measure, patients with one or more fills 
for sacubitril / valsartan were excluded from the denominator. As long as eligibility criteria were 
met, patients could serve as a denominator for all three adherence measures. In this way, 
medication adherence as a dichotomous variable was defined for patients across the three 
different adherence measures. 
  Pharmacies were attributed to patients based upon previous fill history for eligible 
medications in each of the three adherence measures. If medications within the therapeutic 
category were filled at multiple pharmacies, the most frequent (i.e., mode) of representative 
pharmacies was attributed to the patient. In the event where two or more pharmacies tied for 
most frequent fills, the pharmacy visited last in the measurement period was attributed to the 
patient. A different pharmacy could be attributed to the same patient across each of the 
adherence measures. For example, for a single patient one pharmacy could be attributed to both 
the hypertension and diabetes measure whereas a completely different pharmacy be attributed to 
the cholesterol measure, based upon fill history across each measure. The decision to attribute 
pharmacies as outlined reflects the practices employed by multiple health plans as described by 
an advising third-party expert with direct experience of incentive program implementation. 
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Store adherence scores were then calculated for each pharmacy over the three therapeutic 
categories by dividing the total number of adherent patients (numerator) divided by total number 
of eligible patients for the adherence measure (denominator).  A minimum number of 
denominator patients for each adherence measure was required to calculate the associated 
adherence measure performance score (described more in payer incentive programs). While in 
actual practice individual Medicare plans would generate their own store performance scores, for 
this analysis all available patient data was utilized to generate one global score for each 
adherence measure to provide simplicity in evaluation of VBI programs associated with 
adherence measures. 
Only pharmacies designated as a “community/retail pharmacy” for the primary dispenser 
type were included in the analysis. Examples of pharmacies excluded under this designation 
included long-term care pharmacies, clinic pharmacies, and nuclear pharmacies. The “dispenser 
class” variable, which helps distinguish between independent pharmacies, chain-store 
pharmacies, etc., was used to exclude “alternate dispensing sites”, those pharmacies which do 
not fit into typical descriptions for retail pharmacies.    
 
Payer Incentive Programs 
 Three programs were chosen for evaluation after a comprehensive literature search and 
discussions with experts in implemented payer incentive programs. The three programs chosen 
were a bonus payment program, a medication reimbursement adjustment program, and a limited 
network program. Given the variety of potential options, choice of the three programs was based 
upon feasibility of available data to determine program outcomes and generalizability for other 
pharmacies. For example, bonus payments are well-recognized for already being implemented 
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(IEHP, 2016) in retail pharmacy. Details of implemented programs are generally lacking in 
literature and reports, so characteristics were designed based upon available information as well 
as guidance from third-parties with expertise in implemented payer incentive programs.  
 Bonus Payment Program. Bonus payments are distributed to pharmacies based upon 
whether store adherence to individual measures met pre-defined thresholds. Store adherence 
thresholds were set at 80% and 90% for each adherence measure (i.e., 80% or 90% of all eligible 
patients attributed to the pharmacy classified as “adherent”). For pharmacies achieving 90% 
store adherence for a given measure, $60 was paid per compliant patient. The amount was 
chosen as a conservative estimate of reimbursement for an hour’s worth of MTM services 
(Lewin Group, 2003). It is reasonable to assume a pharmacist may spend an extra hour’s worth 
of time per patient over the course of a year to promote adherence. For pharmacies achieving 
80% to 90% store adherence, bonus payments were halved to $30 per compliant patient. No 
bonus was awarded for store adherence below 80%. Since outcomes of the program were not 
associated with negative consequences (e.g., penalties), only a minimum of 10 denominator 
patients were required to be considered eligible for the program.  
 Medication Reimbursement Adjustment Program. Pharmacies received bonuses or were 
penalized based upon how much their store adherence deviated from the mean store adherence 
for each adherence measure. Pharmacies achieving a store adherence ≥1 standard deviation from 
the mean adherence for each measure received a 1% bonus, based upon total drug costs accrued 
for all patients included in a store’s adherence for the measure. Similarly, those achieving ≥2 
standard deviations from the mean resulted in a 2% bonus. Conversely, those whose store 
adherence for measures was ≤1 and ≤2 standard deviations from the mean resulted in 1% and 2% 
penalties, respectively. To ensure sufficient sample size to determine whether a pharmacy should 
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be rewarded or penalized, a minimum of 30 denominator patients were required to be considered 
eligible for the program.  
 Limited Network Program.  There are generally reasons beyond adherence measures 
which influence a plan’s decision to exclude a pharmacy, such as whether there are any 
reasonable pharmacy alternatives which could serve patients if a given pharmacy was excluded. 
Instead of utilizing adherence measures to describe the effect of a limited network program, an 
analysis of the impact of losing an individual Medicare plan was chosen. Two levels of analysis 
were chosen based upon the total amount of drug costs associated with the plan: pharmacies’ 
largest individual Medicare plan and a “typical” plan, operationalized as a pharmacy’s median 
plan. The relative impact of both levels of Medicare plans, including patient size, number of 
prescriptions, and associated drug costs were described.   
 
Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics (mean, median, etc.) of each program’s financial impact (in dollars) 
on community pharmacies was calculated and reported. Subgroup analyses on total Medicare 
prescription volume and pharmacy type (independent vs. chain) were conducted to understand 
how the impact differed for multiple groups. Where available, the difference in groups was 
analyzed to determine if there was a statistical difference. For comparisons with a dichotomous 
dependent variable, a chi-square analysis was used. For comparisons with a continuous 
dependent variable, an independent samples t-test was used when comparing two groups, 
whereas a one-way ANOVA was used when comparing more than two groups. Significance was 
set at 0.05 for all tests. 
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Results 
 
 A total of 713 retail pharmacies met eligibility criteria to be included in the study.   
Among the pharmacies, 307 (43%) were identified as independent pharmacies, 394 (55%) as 
chain pharmacies (defined as part of a group of 4 or more under the same ownership), 9 (1%) as 
franchise pharmacies, and 3 (<1%) as government pharmacies. Subgroup analyses were only 
conducted between independent and chain pharmacies due to lack of sample on other types. 
Franchise pharmacies are independently owned but affiliated with another company, resulting in 
shared resources and the other company’s brand. It is difficult to accurately determine whether a 
franchise pharmacy behaves closer to an independent or chain pharmacy, so they were not 
attributed to either group for the subgroup analysis. 
 
Store Performance on Adherence Measures 
 Of the 713 pharmacies, 695 had at least one Medicare patient who met eligibility criteria 
for one of the adherence measures. When accounting for the minimum patient requirements to be 
included in the first two programs, a total of 679 pharmacies met criteria to be included in the 
bonus payment strategy (10 patient minimum) whereas 663 met criteria to be included in the 
medication adherence strategy (30 patient minimum).  A summary of differences between the 
two minimum patient requirements can be found in Table 1.  
 For the bonus payment program (≥10 patient minimum requirement per threshold), the 
majority (97.5%) of pharmacies were eligible for all three adherence measures. The diabetes 
measure appeared to have fewer patients on average included in the measure. Higher mean store 
adherence was observed for the hypertension measure (0.770) compared to the diabetes (0.730) 
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and cholesterol (0.715) measures. When comparing mean store adherence between independent 
pharmacies and chain store pharmacies, a significantly lower mean adherence was observed in 
independent pharmacies for both the hypertension measure (0.753 vs 0.782, p<0. 001) and the 
cholesterol measure (0.701 vs 0.726, p<0.001), with no significant difference for the diabetes 
measure. 
 Few meaningful differences were noted when the minimum patient requirement was 
increased to ≥30 patients for the medication reimbursement adjustment program. A smaller 
percentage of pharmacies eligible for all three adherence measures (85.2%) was observed, likely 
the result of a large drop in pharmacies eligible for the diabetes measure. Mean store adherence 
remained fairly consistent between adherence measures. A significantly lower mean store 
adherence for independent pharmacies compared to chain pharmacies was again observed for 
both the hypertension measure (0.755 vs 0.782, p<0.001) and the cholesterol measure (0.702 vs 
0.725, p<0.001), whereas no significant difference was observed for the diabetes measure.  
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TABLE 4-1. Demographics of Pharmacies Eligible for Store Adherence Programs 
  
≥10 patient minimum per 
adherence measure 
(Bonus Payment Program) 
≥30 patient minimum per 
adherence measure 
(Medication Reimbursement 
Adjustment Program) 
Pharmacies Meeting Eligibility Criteria   
 # eligible for ≥1 adherence measure 679 663 
 # eligible for ≥2 adherence measure (%) 677 (99.7%) 656 (98.9%) 
 # eligible for all 3 adherence measures (%) 662 (97.5%) 565 (85.2%) 
    
Diabetes Adherence Measure   
 # of pharmacies eligible 662 565 
 Mean # of patients included (range) 77 (10 to 327) 86 (30 to 327) 
 Mean store adherence (SD) 0.730 (0.081) 0.728 (0.073) 
   
Hypertension Adherence Measure   
 # of pharmacies eligible 678 661 
 Mean # of patients included (range) 197 (10 to 886) 202 (31 to 886) 
 Mean store adherence (SD) 0.770 (0.063) 0.771 (0.059) 
   
Cholesterol Adherence Measure   
 # of pharmacies eligible 678 658 
 Mean # of patients included (range) 197 (10 to 793) 202 (30 to 793) 
 Mean store adherence (SD) 0.715 (0.064) 0.715 (0.061) 
 
 
Bonus Payment Program 
 A total of unique 679 pharmacies were eligible to be included for the bonus payment 
program once the minimum requirement of 10 eligible patients for a given adherence measure 
was accounted for. If implemented, a total of $1.45M would be distributed among 283 
pharmacies (41.7% of those eligible) based upon adherence performance scores. Out of those 
receiving a bonus, 254 (89.8%) pharmacies would receive bonuses less than $10,000, 27 
pharmacies (9.5%) would receive bonuses between $10,000 and $20,000, and 2 pharmacies 
(0.7%) would receive bonuses greater than $30,000. The average total payment given to 
pharmacies receiving bonuses would be $5,114.  
 Comparing bonus paid for adherence measures, the hypertension adherence measure 
would result in the highest percentage of eligible pharmacies who would receive payment as well 
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as the largest sum of total bonuses paid. Approximately $1.10M would be distributed to 33% of 
eligible pharmacies for the adherence measure. For pharmacies receiving a bonus through a 
given adherence measure, the average bonus would be $1,533 for the diabetes measure, $4,984 
for the hypertension measure, and $3,354 for the cholesterol measure. A summary of the bonuses 
paid for the program can be found in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 4-2. Description of Rewards for Bonus Payments Program 
Total Sample      
  
N (%) Mean (SD) Median Range 
Sum of  
Bonuses 
All Eligible Pharmacies 679     
 Total Bonus Payment 283 (42%) $5,114 ($4,470) $3,990 $360 to $35,940 $1.45M 
       
Diabetes Adherence Measure 662     
 No Bonus Payment 548 (83%) - - - - 
 Store Adherence ≥0.8 and <0.9 102 (15%) $1,546 ($980) $1,395 $270 to $4,740 $157,710 
 Store Adherence ≥0.9 12 (2%) $1,420 ($735) $1,230 $540 to $3,060 $17,040 
      
Hypertension Adherence Measure 678     
 No Bonus Payment 457 (67%) - - - - 
 Store Adherence ≥0.8 and <0.9 214 (32%) $5,026 ($3,432) $4,095 $240 to $18,480 $1.08M 
 Store Adherence ≥0.9 7 (1%) $3,703 ($3,676) $2,940 $780 to $11,520 $25,920 
      
Cholesterol Adherence Measure 678     
 No Bonus Payment 627 (92%) - - - - 
 Store Adherence ≥0.8 and <0.9 49 (7%) $3,390 ($3,378) $2,580 $360 to $17,460 $166,110 
 Store Adherence ≥0.9 2 (<1%) $2,460 ($2,630) $2,460 $600 to $4,320 $4,920 
       
Prescription Volume Comparisons 
  <30 / day 
(n=127) 
30-59 / day 
(n=255) 
60-89 / day 
(n=161) 
≥90 / day 
(n=136) 
P Value 
% Pharmacies Receiving Bonus 54.33 40.78 39.75 33.82 0.007b 
Mean Bonusa  
(SD) 
$2,070 
($1,356) 
$4,188 
($2,493) 
$5,889 
($3,133) 
$10,695 
($6,750) 
<0.001c 
       
Independent vs. Chain Store Comparisons 
  Independent Pharmacies 
(n=283) 
Chain Store Pharmacies 
(n=385) 
P Value 
% Pharmacies Receiving Bonus 35.69 45.97 0.008b 
Mean Bonusa (SD) $3,848 ($4,038) $6,095 ($4,470) <0.001d 
aOnly accounting for those receiving a bonus 
bChi-Square test used to measure difference between the two groups 
cOne way ANOVA used to test differences between groups 
dIndependent samples t-test used to test difference of amount of bonus received for pharmacies receiving a bonus 
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Medication Reimbursement Adjustment Program 
 A total of unique 663 pharmacies were eligible to be included for the medication 
reimbursement adjustment program once the minimum requirement of 30 eligible patients for a 
given adherence measure was accounted for. If implemented, a total of 179 pharmacies (27%) 
would receive bonuses for their performance while 175 pharmacies (26%) would be penalized. 
The sum of bonuses paid would be $172,701 whereas the amount of penalties levied would be 
$188,489, resulting in a net savings to the program of $15,789. The average total bonus received 
by a pharmacy would be $965 and the average penalty would be $1,077. The average outcome 
for pharmacies impacted by the strategy would be a penalty of $45. The maximum amount of 
additional compensation paid to a pharmacy would be $4,044, whereas the maximum penalty 
levied against a pharmacy would be $5,205. 
For the diabetes measure, 70 pharmacies would receive bonuses while 76 would be 
penalized. The overall average outcome for pharmacies impacted would be a $135 penalty. For 
the hypertension measure, 78 pharmacies would receive bonuses while 82 would be penalized. 
The overall average outcome for pharmacies impacted would be a $21 penalty. For the 
cholesterol measure, 98 would receive bonuses while 100 would be penalized. The overall 
average outcome for pharmacies impacted would be a $38 bonus. The diabetes measure resulted 
in both the highest reward ($4,044) and penalty ($4,401) attributed to a pharmacy across all three 
measures. A summary of the rewards and penalties associated with strategy can be found in 
Table 3. 
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TABLE 4-3. Description of Rewards & Penalties for Medication Reimbursement Adjustment Program 
Total Sample      
  
N (%) Mean (SD) Median Range 
Sum of  
Rewards 
& 
Penalties 
All Eligible Pharmacies 663     
 Total Pharmacies Impacted 354 (53%) -$45 ($1,448) $39 -$5,205 to $4,044 -$15,789 
       
Diabetes Adherence Measure 565     
 +2% Bonus (≥2 SD) 6 (1%) $1,263 ($627) $1,201 $457 to $2,151 $7,580 
 +1% Bonus (≥1SD, <2SD) 64 (11%) $1,607 ($754) $1,462 $498 to $4,044 $102,857 
 No Bonus / Penalty 419 (74%) - - - - 
 -1% Penalty (≤1 SD, >2SD) 51 (9%) -$1,592 ($836) -$1,516 -$3,696 to -$237 -$81,175 
 -2% Penalty (≤2 SD) 25 (4%) -$1,957 ($1,109) -$1,617 -$4,401 to -$366 -$48,935 
      
Hypertension Adherence Measure 661     
 +2% Bonus (≥2 SD) 6 (1%) $307 ($267) $186 $76 to $647 $1,841 
 +1% Bonus (≥1SD, <2SD) 72 (11%) $224 ($148) $191 $8 to $666 $16,141 
 No Bonus / Penalty 491 (74%) - - - - 
 -1% Penalty (≤1 SD, >2SD) 73 (11%) -$209 ($149) -$167 -$873 to -$26 -$15,260 
 -2% Penalty (≤2 SD) 19 (3%) -$242 ($249) -$296 -$1,050 to -$33 -$6,300 
      
Cholesterol Adherence Measure 658     
 +2% Bonus (≥2 SD) 5 (1%) $394 ($371) $284 $91 to $998 $1,972 
 +1% Bonus (≥1SD, <2SD) 93 (14%) $493 ($369) $371 $49 to $1,880 $45,883 
 No Bonus / Penalty 460 (70%) - - - - 
 -1% Penalty (≤1 SD, >2SD) 84 (13%) -$366 ($229) -$329 -$1,438 to -$36 -$30,764 
 -2% Penalty (≤2 SD) 16 (2%) -$602 ($462) -$485 -$1,875 to -$117 -$9,627 
       
Prescription Volume Comparisons 
  <30 / day 
(n=111) 
30-59 / day 
(n=255) 
60-89 / day 
(n=161) 
≥90 / day 
(n=136) 
P Value 
% Pharmacies Receiving Bonus 34.23 28.24 27.33 18.38 0.041b 
% Pharmacies Penalized 33.33 29.80 25.47 15.44 0.005b 
Mean Bonusa  
(SD) 
$226  
($196) 
$773  
($720) 
$1,356  
($813) 
$1,951 
($972) 
<0.001c 
 
Mean Penaltya  
(SD) 
-$510  
($747) 
-$816  
($732) 
-$1,765  
($1,354) 
-$1,679  
($1,588) 
<0.001c 
 
       
Independent vs. Chain Store Comparisons     
  Independent Pharmacies 
(n=271) 
Chain Store Pharmacies 
(n=383) 
P Value 
% Pharmacies Receiving Bonus 23.99 29.24 0.136b 
% Pharmacies Penalized 36.16 19.32 <0.001b 
Mean Bonusa (SD) $859 ($826) $1,027 ($939) 0.234d 
Mean Penaltya (SD) -$904 ($1,115) -$1,324($1,165) 0.017d 
aOnly accounting for those receiving a bonus / penalty 
bChi-Square test used to measure difference between the two groups 
cOne way ANOVA used to test differences between groups 
dIndependent samples t-test used to test difference of bonus / penalty for pharmacies receiving a bonus / penalty 
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Limited Network Program 
 A total of 713 MS retail pharmacies were identified in the analysis with an average of 22 
individual plans associated with each pharmacy. Of the 713 pharmacies, 6 (1%) only had 1 
Medicare plan associated with the pharmacy, 4 (1%) were associated with between 2 and 9 
plans, 193 (27%) were associated with between 10 and 19 plans, 444 (62%) were associated with 
between 20 and 29 plans, 64 (9%) were associated with between 30 and 39 plans, and 2 (<1%) 
were associated with greater than 40 plans. On average, pharmacies’ Medicare business 
accounted for 782 patients, 21,876 prescriptions, and $1.34M worth of drug costs. Out of the 713 
total pharmacies, 712 were included in the analysis to determine impact of a limited network for 
the largest plan and median plan. One pharmacy was excluded as the only Medicare plan 
associated with the pharmacy was a LI NET plan. The summary of the limited network program 
results can be found in Table 4. 
 Overall, the loss of pharmacies’ largest Medicare plan would account for a loss of 
approximately 24% of unique Medicare beneficiaries, 26% of total Medicare prescriptions, and 
29% of their total Medicare drug costs. Conversely, the loss of a pharmacy’s median Medicare 
plan would account for a loss of 3% of total Medicare business across the three groups. 
Significant differences were observed for prescription volume groups for associated drugs costs 
of both largest and median Medicare plans. When comparing independent pharmacies to chain 
pharmacies, the relative impact of a loss of either the largest or the median Medicare plan was 
significantly higher for independent pharmacies. This reflects the mean number of distinct 
Medicare plans associated with both groups: 19.5 plans for independent pharmacies and 24.5 
plans for chain store pharmacies (p<0.001). It is of note the loss of an independent pharmacy’s 
median Medicare plan was approximately double that of chain stores’ median plan.  
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TABLE 4-4. Description of Results for Limited Network Program 
Total Sample    
  
Mean (SD) 
Mean % of Total 
Medicare (SD) 
Range 
Largest Medicare Plans    
 # of patients 186 (136) 24.28 (9.38) 1 to 840 
 # of prescriptions 5,587 (4,289) 25.88 (9.89) 1 to 42,609 
 Associated drug costs $374,308 ($420,530) 28.95 (9.98) $41 to $8.56M 
     
Median Medicare Plans    
 # of patients 16 (12) 3.27 (8.46) 1 to 94 
 # of prescriptions 441 (367) 3.19 (8.57) 1 to 4,089 
 Associated drug costs $24,070 ($26,737) 2.90 (8.72) $41 to $557,152 
     
Prescription Volume Comparisons 
  <30 / day 
(n=161) 
30-59 / day 
(n=255) 
60-89 / day 
(n=161) 
≥90 / day 
(n=136) 
P Valuea 
Largest Medicare Plan – Mean % of Total Medicare (SD) 
 # of patients 25.59 (16.17) 23.55 (6.34) 23.64 (5.49) 24.89 (6.36) 0.113 
 # of prescriptions 27.68 (16.60) 25.42 (7.27) 25.10 (5.91) 25.56 (6.67) 0.071 
 Associated drug costs 32.27 (15.82) 28.83 (7.67) 27.48 (6.73) 27.00 (6.78) <0.001 
       
Median Medicare Plan – Mean % of Total Medicare (SD) 
 # of patients 6.98 (17.17) 2.61 (1.64) 2.01 (1.29) 1.62 (1.21) <0.001 
 # of prescriptions 6.93 (17.44) 2.53 (1.50) 1.93 (1.18) 1.53 (1.09) <0.001 
 Associated drug costs 6.36 (17.92) 2.22 (0.94) 1.75 (0.87) 1.48 (0.89) <0.001 
       
Independent vs. Chain Store Comparisons   
  Independent 
Pharmacies (n=307) 
Chain Store 
Pharmacies (n=394) 
P Valueb 
Largest Medicare Plan – Mean % of Total Medicare (SD) 
 # of patients 26.47 (11.99) 22.58 (6.35) <0.001 
 # of prescriptions 28.91 (12.68) 23.55 (6.22) <0.001 
 Associated drug costs 32.77 (12.44) 25.93 (6.21) <0.001 
     
Median Medicare Plan – Mean % of Total Medicare (SD) 
 # of patients 4.68 (12.57) 2.18 (1.94) <0.001 
 # of prescriptions 4.63 (12.77) 2.09 (1.78) <0.001 
 Associated drug costs 4.36 (13.09) 1.78 (1.03) <0.001 
aOne way ANOVA used to test differences between groups 
bIndependent samples t-test used to test difference between groups 
 
  
Further analysis on the plans with the largest contribution to drug costs for retail 
pharmacies found the top 5 Medicare plans accounted for approximately 66% of all Medicare 
drug costs within the state. Furthermore, at least one of the top 5 plans were observed in 709 
pharmacies (99%), whereas all 5 top plans were accounted for in 695 pharmacies (97%). A top 5 
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plan was also observed as an individual pharmacy’s largest Medicare plan in 672 pharmacies 
(94%).  On average, the accumulation of the top 5 plans accounted for 66% of individual 
pharmacies’ total Medicare drug costs. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 The results of this study help provide context to the financial impact of VBI programs 
health insurance plans may implement for pharmacies within their network. This study is one of 
the first known studies to estimate outcomes from three possible VBI programs using Medicare 
claims data. Actual programs may differ in practice, such as the inclusion of additional store-
level measures (e.g., complete medication review) or differences in eligibility and payment 
structures (e.g., all pharmacies meeting a minimum threshold eligible to “compete” for a pool of 
bonuses among all other pharmacies in the network). Regardless, the possible scenarios depicted 
through the study provide a foundation for pharmacists and researchers to understand how 
community pharmacies may be impacted with the increasing shift to value-based models of care. 
 The outcomes of the first two programs, bonus payments and medication reimbursement 
adjustment, were based on medication adherence performance measures. When comparing 
between the two minimum patient requirements for each program, it is worth noting the 
relatively minimal differences for both pharmacy eligibility and mean store adherence, with an 
exception for store eligibility for the diabetes measure. The 15% drop in number of pharmacies 
eligible when moving to the higher patient requirement is reflective of the generally overall 
smaller number of eligible patients present in the measure compared to the other two measures.  
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When considering independent pharmacies and chain store pharmacies, the fewer patients 
generally associated with independent pharmacies and ability to implement store-level changes 
without corporate approval (e.g., chain stores) might be expected to translate into better 
individual patient care and adherence. However, the study observed a significantly lower store 
adherence in the hypertension and cholesterol measures for independent pharmacies compared to 
chain pharmacies. The results were reflected in the bonuses and penalties distributed across both 
the bonus payment and medication reimbursement programs. The study’s results differ from that 
of Kalsekar et al.’s (2007), a retrospective cohort study evaluating Medicaid claims data which 
found a higher prevalence of adherent patients associated with independent pharmacies 
compared to chain pharmacies for oral hypoglycemic agents. While the two different patient 
populations of the two studies (i.e., Medicaid vs. Medicare) may account for some portion of the 
different study results, the recent consideration and implementation of VBI programs may also 
have resulted in chain stores placing a greater emphasis on medication adherence than in 
previous years. Future research should seek to further understand the differences between these 
two types of pharmacies and additional variables which may explain potential differences in 
store adherence, including geographical differences (i.e., urban vs. rural) and whether risk-
adjustment may minimalize these differences (Dharmarajan et al., 2014). 
 Overall, less than half of pharmacies would receive additional compensation through the 
bonus payment program as designed. While pre-defined goals were set for the strategy, a plan 
could choose to adjust the thresholds based upon actual store adherence, such as decrease the 
thresholds for the diabetes and cholesterol measure since relatively few pharmacies were eligible 
for a bonus for each measure (17% and 8%, respectively). For those pharmacies that would 
currently require large improvements to achieve a bonus payment (e.g., store adherence ~0.7) 
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and thus may be less likely to try to improve performance, reducing thresholds might result in 
more of an incentive to achieve higher ratings. However, if a plan did not want to pay more than 
$1.45M already accounted for in the program, this would require a decrease in the amount per 
compliant patient paid as more pharmacies became eligible for a bonus. That said, it is unclear 
whether the average payment of $5,114 may be enough to incentive pharmacies. Considering 
plans can receive billions of dollars for achieving higher Star Ratings (Galewitz, 2016), it may be 
more favorable to plans to do so when striving for the highest ratings.  
 The medication reimbursement program resulted in a more favorable outcome for health 
plans through balancing of rewards and penalties to pharmacies. Approximately half of all 
pharmacies were impacted, although the impact was noticeably less than the bonus payment 
strategy. The highest penalizations and highest bonuses were relatively minimal given the 
amount of Medicare dollars associated with pharmacies. A health plan could choose to utilize 
additional levels of bonus / penalty (e.g., ±0.5%, ±1.5%) to further incentivize pharmacies. 
Additionally, the amount of bonus / penalty attributed could be increased to create greater 
degrees of positive reinforcement (bonus) and negative punishment (penalty) (McLeod, 2007). 
While the bonuses / penalties were constrained to the drug costs associated with eligible patients, 
some plans could also choose to provide a bonus or penalty for all drug costs associated with a 
given Medicare plan. Considering the mean drug costs associated with pharmacies’ largest drug 
plan was $374,308, just an 1% impact could result in either a gain or loss of $37,431, resulting in 
a larger impact to the pharmacy.  
 While no performance metrics (e.g., store adherence) were used to describe impact of a 
limited network program, pharmacists should still take note of how a given Medicare plan may 
affect individual store business if the pharmacy is excluded from the network. While a “typical” 
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(median) Medicare plan may only affect approximately 3% of a pharmacy’s Medicare business, 
additional negative consequences can occur not described in this study. For example, a loss of 
one Medicare plan may cause a negative feedback loop which results in fewer recommendations 
to the pharmacy and an impact on overall business, Medicare or otherwise. Furthermore, it 
should be noted the top 5 Medicare plans accounted for 66% of all Medicare business in 
community pharmacies. Pharmacists should take care in considering the patients associated with 
their top plans, as they are in a better position to implement VBI programs and will have the 
largest impact on individual stores.  
 
 
Assumptions and Limitations 
 
 For the bonus payment and medication reimbursement adjustment programs, all 
Medicare plans were used to analyze individual store performance and model the outcomes of 
the programs. In actual practice, different Medicare plans may implement different programs 
(including none at all) and less store-level data will be available for each plan.  This will result in 
diminished outcomes than what was shown within this study. Additionally, programs 
implemented may be much more complex, including both adjustments to medication 
reimbursement and providing bonus payment at the same time. Still, the purpose of the study 
was to provide an initial view at how a set of basic programs could impact pharmacies, not 
provide an accurate forecast of actual impact to community pharmacies.  
 It should also be noted a general limitation of utilizing insurance claims data to measure 
patient adherence is the lack of available information on prescriptions paid for by cash. 
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Considering the three adherence measure have an abundance of generic options which are 
associated with low cash out-of-pocket costs for patients, overall adherence of patients may have 
been underestimated. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Although health plans have started adopting different programs to try to incentivize 
community pharmacies to improve performance on quality metrics such as patient adherence, 
little research has been conducted to understand the potential impact on pharmacies from these 
programs. As VBI models are implemented for community pharmacy, it will be imperative for 
pharmacists to be proactive in understanding potential impact to their stores. This study presents 
an evaluation of how three distinct programs may impact community pharmacies. Additional 
research is warranted to provide further insight into the programs being implemented and a 
detailed analysis of the impact to pharmacies affected. Doing so may help pharmacists and health 
plans alike in cooperatively designing VBI programs which benefit both parties.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This dissertation explores the impact of CMS’ Medicare Star Ratings program on retail 
pharmacies. Currently, health plans are implementing different value-based incentive (VBI) 
programs to try to incentivize pharmacies to achieve higher performance ratings on quality 
measures, particularly those related to star ratings. Despite the present changes occurring in 
pharmacy associated with VBI programs, little research has been conducted to understand the 
relative impact on retail pharmacies. This dissertation sought to provide a greater understanding 
of this impact through three specific goals: 1) identifying potential VBI programs being 
implemented and defining a conceptual framework of the strategies being employed with each 
VBI program; 2) understanding retail pharmacists’ attitudes and perceptions of quality measure 
and impact of potential VBI programs; and 3) evaluate the potential financial impact of select 
VBI programs on retail pharmacies. 
The first paper (Chapter 2) provides a categorization of potential VBI strategies being 
employed through various VBI programs. The paper defines three distinct strategies: quality-
based payment (QBP), value-based contracting (VBC), and quality-based network (QBN). Each 
strategy presents a distinct way health plans are attempting to improve quality performance 
ratings from retail pharmacies. Furthermore, the paper identifies 5 distinct VBI programs being 
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considered or already implemented which reflect the strategies defined in the categorization of 
VBI strategies and characteristics of how they may be implemented in practice. A survey was 
used to support the collection on information on potential programs being considered or 
implemented. The paper compares identified strategies and programs to established theory in 
human behavior research (operant conditioning). Overall, the paper helps provide a more 
cohesive understanding of how certain dynamics of the health plan-retail pharmacy relationship 
are evolving to place an emphasis on quality performance ratings through VBI programs. 
The second paper (Chapter 3) explores retail pharmacy’s perception of these changing 
dynamics. Pharmacy managers from both independent and chain retail pharmacies who were 
actively engaged in understanding and adapting to quality performance ratings were interviewed. 
While several concerns were voiced regarding the resources required and change necessary to 
achieve high ratings, the respondents generally favored the impact of quality measures on the 
profession of pharmacy and the quality of care provided to patients. While research has 
previously been conducted understanding the perceptions of the lay retail pharmacist on star 
ratings, this paper provides a more nuanced perspective of those being proactive in addressing 
how quality performance ratings may affect retail pharmacy practice. In doing so, this paper adds 
to the literature by adding a more robust discussion of pharmacist attitudes and opinions of the 
changes occurring due to the environment’s shifting focus toward incentivizing high-quality 
performance ratings. 
The third paper (Chapter 4) evaluates the financial impact to retail pharmacies of possible 
VBI programs. Three examples of VBI programs were developed and their outcomes estimated 
in Mississippi Medicare claims data. The research provides the first look at how pharmacies may 
be rewarded or penalized based upon their performance. Particularly, the financial impact from a 
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pharmacy losing their largest Medicare contract demonstrates the need for retail pharmacies to 
pay close attention to the VBI programs being implemented within the health plans of their 
patients. While programs implemented in practice may differ than those evaluated in the 
research, the outcomes still provide a foundation for pharmacists and health plans to discuss the 
impact of VBI programs and cooperatively design programs which benefit both parties. 
 
 
Implications for Future Research 
 
The research associated with this dissertation was conducted with the goal of providing a 
greater understanding to how retail pharmacy is being impacted by healthcare’s shift toward 
achieving high quality performance ratings. While the research represents a meaningful step 
forward in understanding the impact of VBI programs on the retail pharmacy, there remains 
much to understand. While five distinct VBI programs were identified, additional programs are 
likely to be developed. The three strategies proposed through this research should serve as a 
foundation to help explain different programs, and if needed additional strategies can be 
considered as new ways for health plans and pharmacies to collaborate are established. Future 
research should attempt to provide even more detailed information on implemented VBI 
strategies to help guide researchers as well as provide examples for stakeholders to use when 
designing new VBI programs. Research should continue to understand pharmacists’ perspective 
of VBI programs. Specifically, better understanding relationships between financial incentives 
and pharmacist willingness to engage in improving quality performance ratings would be 
worthwhile in the development of VBI programs. Furthermore, such research might help 
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elucidate additional ways for health plans to engage with pharmacists which benefit both parties. 
Finally, as new VBI programs are identified, research should continue to try to estimate the 
potential financial impact on retail pharmacies to help pharmacists understand the potential 
implications on their practice.  
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Payer Survey 
 
 
Q1 Thank you for your interest in the study. We believe your insight will be valuable to 
understanding how health insurance plans are evaluating and interacting with community 
pharmacy practice in response to quality performance measures. Before we begin, please answer 
the following questions to ensure that you are eligible to complete the survey. 
 
 
 
Q2 What is your title within the health plan? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q3 Approximately how many total lives are covered under your plan? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q4 Which type of lives does your plan cover? (Click all that apply) 
▢ Commercial lives  (1)  
▢ Medicare Advantage (MA) lives  (2)  
▢ Medicare Advantage with Part D (MA-PD) lives  (3)  
▢ Part D only (PD) lives  (4)  
▢ Medicaid Managed Care lives  (5)  
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Q5 
 
 
 
 
Q6 Using the graphic above, please select all regions where you have covered lives. 
▢ ⊗All regions  (19)  
▢ Northeast  (15)  
▢ South  (16)  
▢ Midwest  (17)  
▢ West  (18)  
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Q7 Do your job responsibilities include understanding quality performance ratings of the 
pharmacies within your health plan's network? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
 
Q8 How knowledgeable are you about whether your plan has considered or implemented various 
strategies such as pay-for-performance (i.e. bonus payments) or quality-based networks (i.e. 
pharmacies included based on performance) to try to boost quality performance ratings from 
pharmacies within the health plan's network? 
o Extremely knowledgeable  (1)  
o Very knowledgeable  (2)  
o Moderately knowledgeable  (3)  
o Slightly knowledgeable  (4)  
o Not knowledgeable at all  (5)  
 
 
(IF RESPONDENT FAILED SCREENER CRITERIA) 
 
Q9 Thank you for taking the time to consider participating in this research. However, you do not 
appear to meet the criteria to participate, which includes job responsibilities of understanding 
how your plan evaluates quality performance ratings for pharmacies in your network. If you 
know of someone that meets this criteria, please consider directing them to this survey. If you 
feel that you do indeed meet the criteria, please contact the study author, Tristen Jackson, at 
thjackso@go.olemiss.edu, to discuss the possibility of still participating. 
 
 
(IF RESPONDENT PASSED SCREENER CRITERIA) 
 
Q10 Your responses indicate you are eligible to participate in this study. Please read each of the 
following 4 pages carefully and answer the questions. Your participation in this study is crucial 
to understanding how health insurance plans are evaluating pharmacy quality performance 
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measures and implementing strategies to try to encourage pharmacies to try to improve their own 
performance. 
 
Q11  
Page 1 of 4 
 
 
Q12 Please carefully read through this brief background of quality performance measures 
and strategies to boost pharmacy quality performance ratings.      
 
Increasingly, health plans are taking an interest in the quality of care community pharmacies 
deliver.  Quality of care is reflected through specific quality performance measures that are 
assessed through administrative claims data associated with the pharmacy.  While quality 
measures associated with CMS Star Ratings (i.e. medication adherence for non-insulin diabetes 
medications) are those most likely to be utilized in measuring pharmacy performance, some 
plans include additional measures such as percentage of generics products dispensed over brand 
products (where applicable) or the number of 90 day medication supplies dispensed for chronic 
medications.      
 
Regardless of the specific quality measures being assessed, many plans have begun to implement 
various strategies to try to boost the performance of these measures for the pharmacies in their 
network. These “incentive” strategies appear to generally align with one of three primary 
categories: 
 
• Pay-for-Performance (P4P)       
o Bonus payments or compensation is given based upon performance scores.     
   
• Value-Based Contracting      
o Contracting with pharmacies is altered based upon pharmacy performance. This 
can include decreasing the direct and indirect remuneration (DIR) fees associated 
with pharmacy contracting or altering medication reimbursement that a pharmacy 
receives in accordance to performance scores       
• Quality-Based Networks (QBN)      
o Poorly performing pharmacies are either placed on a “non-preferred” tier where 
patients pay higher copays to visit, or completely removed from the network if 
performance is too low. These strategies indirectly affect pharmacies by shifting 
where patients are likely to get their medications filled.        
  
Given all this, please read and respond to the following prompts.             
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Q13 Given the description above of the three primary strategies, please rate how effective you 
believe each type of strategy (used alone) would be in increasing quality performance ratings of 
retail pharmacies. 
 
Not effective at 
all (1) 
Slightly 
effective (2) 
Moderately 
effective (3) 
Very effective 
(4) 
Extremely 
effective (5) 
Pay-for-
Performance 
(P4P) (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
Value-Based 
Contracting (2)  o  o  o  o  o  
Quality-Based 
Networks 
(QBN) (3)  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
Q14  
Page 2 of 4 
 
 
 
Q15  
Quality Performance Ratings   
    
Please review through the following potential quality performance ratings and indicate whether 
the potential measure is:     
• Used to influence payment decisions of pharmacies in your network (i.e. bonus 
payments, DIR fees, medication reimbursement)   
• Used to influence network decisions of pharmacies in your network (i.e. preferred vs. 
non-preferred pharmacies, removing pharmacy from network)   
• Used only to monitor pharmacy performance, but not to make payment or network 
decisions from; or 
• Not monitored at the pharmacy level  
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Q16 CMS Part D Measures 
 
Influences 
pharmacy payment 
decisions (1) 
Influences 
pharmacy network 
decisions (2) 
Only monitored at 
pharmacy level (3) 
Not monitored at 
pharmacy level (4) 
Medication 
adherence for non-
insulin diabetes 
medications (1)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Medication 
adherence for 
hypertension 
medications (RAS 
antagonists) (2)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Medication 
adherence for 
cholesterol 
medications 
(statins) (3)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Medication therapy 
management 
(MTM) program 
completion rate for 
comprehensive 
medication reviews 
(CMRs) (5)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Ensuring statin use 
in patients with 
diabetes age 40 to 
75 years (display 
measure for 2017) 
(7)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
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Q17 CMS Part D Display Measures 
 
Influences 
pharmacy payment 
decisions (1) 
Influences 
pharmacy network 
decisions (2) 
Only monitored at 
pharmacy level (3) 
Not monitored at 
pharmacy level (4) 
Avoidance of drug-
drug interactions (1)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Avoidance of 
excessive doses of 
oral diabetes 
medications (2)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Ensuring statin use 
in patients with 
diabetes age 40 to 
75 years (display 
measure for 2017) 
(3)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Appropriate use of 
high risk 
medications in 
patients 65 years or 
older (4)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
 
 
 
 
Q18 Part C Measures 
 
Influences 
pharmacy payment 
decisions (1) 
Influences 
pharmacy network 
decisions (2) 
Only monitored at 
pharmacy level (3) 
Not monitored at 
pharmacy level (4) 
Osteoporosis 
management in 
women who have 
had a fracture (2)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Glucose control in 
diabetes patients (3)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Blood pressure 
control (4)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
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Q19 Part C Display Measures 
 
Influences 
pharmacy payment 
decisions (1) 
Influences 
pharmacy network 
decisions (2) 
Only monitored at 
pharmacy level (3) 
Not monitored at 
pharmacy level (4) 
Administration of 
pneumococcal 
vaccine (where 
appropriate) (1)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Drug treatment of 
COPD with 
bronchodilators or 
systemic 
corticosteroids as 
appropriate (2)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Q20 Other 
 
Influences 
pharmacy payment 
decisions (1) 
Influences 
pharmacy network 
decisions (2) 
Only monitored at 
pharmacy level (3) 
Not monitored at 
pharmacy level (4) 
Patient experience 
in getting a needed 
medication (Part of 
CAHPS) (7)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Annual influenza 
vaccine (Part of 
CAHPS) (8)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Percentage of 
generic products 
dispensed over 
brand products 
(where applicable) 
(1)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Number of 90 day 
supplies dispensed 
for chronic 
medications (2)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
If applicable, please 
designate any other 
measures: (3)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
If applicable, please 
designate any other 
measures: (4)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
If applicable, please 
designate any other 
measures: (5)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
If applicable, please 
designate any other 
measures: (6)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
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Q21  
Page 3 of 4 
 
 
 
Q22 This page will describe five specific pharmacy performance strategies that health plans may 
adopt to try to increase quality performance ratings of retail pharmacies.  
    
One of the most common ways that these five strategies can differ is whether they utilize a 
“threshold” or “tournament” type of performance measure evaluation.  For each scenario, 
"threshold", "tournament", and "both threshold and tournament" systems are defined as such:      
• Threshold system: Positive or negative outcomes are based upon whether the pharmacy 
meets specific thresholds (i.e. at least 90% of patients being adherent to oral diabetes 
medications or at least 85% of patients being adherent to all three medication adherence 
quality measures).   
• Tournament system: Positive or negative outcomes are based upon how pharmacies' 
quality performance ratings compare to other pharmacies within a specified network 
within the plan.  In this type of system, the best performing pharmacies would receive the 
highest bonus payment in a P4P strategy or the lowest DIR fee assessed in a value-based 
contracting strategy.   
• Both threshold and tournament system: A mixture of both systems. An example would 
be that all pharmacies that meet a certain threshold are in competition for bonus payments 
through a pay-for-performance strategy. Pharmacies that don't meet the threshold might 
either not be eligible for rewards or may be eligible for negative outcomes.    
 
Please read through each scenario and respond to the prompts. 
 
 
 
Q23 Pay-for-Performance Strategies 
 
 
 
Q24 P4P Strategy 1   
Pharmacies receive bonus payments based upon their quality performance ratings.    
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Q25 Please rate how effective you believe each strategy might be. 
 
Not effective at 
all (1) 
Slightly 
effective (2) 
Moderately 
effective (3) 
Very effective 
(4) 
Extremely 
effective (5) 
Bonus 
incentives with 
threshold 
system (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Bonus 
incentives with 
tournament 
system (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Bonus 
incentives with 
both threshold 
and tournament 
system (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Q26 Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such 
a strategy, please indicate "already adopted". 
 Likelihood to adopt   
 
Definitely 
not (1) 
Probably not 
(2) 
Might or 
might not (3) 
Probably yes 
(4) 
Definitely 
yes (5) 
Already 
adopted (1) 
Bonus 
incentives 
with 
threshold 
system (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Bonus 
incentives 
with 
tournament 
system (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Bonus 
incentives 
with both 
threshold and 
tournament 
system (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Q27 Value-Based Contracting Strategies 
 
 
 
Q28 Value-Based Contracting Strategy 1  
Direct and indirect remuneration (DIR) fees, those fees that pharmacies must pay to participate 
in a given network, are altered (typically lowered) based upon pharmacy quality performance 
ratings.    
 
 
 
Q29 Please rate how effective you believe each strategy might be. 
 
Not effective at 
all (1) 
Slightly 
effective (2) 
Moderately 
effective (3) 
Very effective 
(4) 
Extremely 
effective (5) 
DIR fee altered 
based on 
threshold 
system (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
DIR fee altered 
based on 
tournament 
system (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
DIR fee altered 
based on both 
threshold and 
tournament 
system (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Q30 Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such 
a strategy, please indicate "already adopted". 
 Likelihood to adopt   
 
Definitely 
not (1) 
Probably not 
(2) 
Might or 
might not (3) 
Probably yes 
(4) 
Definitely 
yes (5) 
Already 
adopted (1) 
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DIR fee 
altered based 
on threshold 
system (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
DIR fee 
altered based 
on 
tournament 
system (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
DIR fee 
altered based 
on both 
threshold and 
tournament 
system (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Q31 Value-Based Contracting Strategy 2   
Reimbursement of medications is either increased or decreased based upon pharmacy quality 
performance ratings.    
 
 
 
Q32 Please rate how effective you believe each strategy might be. 
 
Not effective at 
all (1) 
Slightly 
effective (2) 
Moderately 
effective (3) 
Very effective 
(4) 
Extremely 
effective (5) 
Medication 
reimbursement 
alteration with 
threshold system 
(1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Medication 
reimbursement 
alteration with 
tournament 
system (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Medication 
reimbursement 
alteration with 
both threshold 
and tournament 
system (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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Q33 Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such 
a strategy, please indicate "already adopted". 
 Likelihood to adopt   
 
Definitely 
not (1) 
Probably not 
(2) 
Might or 
might not (3) 
Probably yes 
(4) 
Definitely 
yes (5) 
Already 
adopted (1) 
Medication 
reimbursement 
alteration with 
threshold 
system (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Medication 
reimbursement 
alteration with 
tournament 
system (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Medication 
reimbursement 
alteration with 
both threshold 
and 
tournament 
system (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Q34 Quality-Based Networks Strategies 
 
 
 
Q35 QBN Strategy 1  
Pharmacies in a health plan's network are classified as either "preferred" or "non-preferred" 
pharmacies based upon quality performance ratings. Patients receive incentives (i.e. lower 
copays) for going to "preferred" pharmacies instead of "non-preferred" ones. We will refer to this 
as the "tiered structure".   
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Q36 Please rate how effective you believe each strategy might be. 
 
Not effective at 
all (1) 
Slightly 
effective (2) 
Moderately 
effective (3) 
Very effective 
(4) 
Extremely 
effective (5) 
Tiered structure 
with threshold 
system (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
Tiered structure 
with tournament 
system (2)  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Q37 Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such 
a strategy, please indicate "already adopted". 
 Likelihood to adopt   
 
Definitely 
not (1) 
Probably not 
(2) 
Might or 
might not (3) 
Probably yes 
(4) 
Definitely 
yes (5) 
Already 
adopted (1) 
Tiered 
structure with 
threshold 
system (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Tiered 
structure with 
tournament 
system (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
Q38 QBN Strategy 2  
 Lowest-performing pharmacies in a health plan's network are excluded from the network.* This 
is sometimes referred to as "narrow networks".    
  *It is understood that due to patient access considerations, not all "low-performing" pharmacies 
could be excluded from the network. Please answer effectivness questions assuming access 
considerations are not an issue and implementation questions considering these realistic 
concerns. 
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Q39 Please rate how effective you believe each strategy might be.  
 
 
For this statement, please consider how effectively you believe it would "incentivize" 
pharmacies to increase their quality performance ratings, not whether by excluding low-
performing pharmacies that it would increase the plan's overall ratings. 
 
Not effective at 
all (1) 
Slightly 
effective (2) 
Moderately 
effective (3) 
Very effective 
(4) 
Extremely 
effective (5) 
Narrow network 
with threshold 
system (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
Narrow network 
with tournament 
system (2)  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
Q40 Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such 
a strategy, please indicate "already adopted". 
 Likelihood to adopt   
 
Definitely 
not (1) 
Probably not 
(2) 
Might or 
might not (3) 
Probably yes 
(4) 
Definitely 
yes (5) 
Already 
adopted (1) 
Narrow 
network with 
threshold 
system (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Narrow 
network with 
tournament 
system (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
Q41  
Page 4 of 4 
Q42 Please rate your likelihood to adopt a case-mix adjustment for pharmacies as you evaluate 
quality performance ratings (i.e. factoring in sociodemographic information of the patient 
population that the pharmacy serves). 
 Likelihood to adopt   
 
Definitely 
not (1) 
Probably not 
(2) 
Might or 
might not (3) 
Probably yes 
(4) 
Definitely 
yes (5) 
Already 
adopted (1) 
Use of case-
mix 
adjustment 
(1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Display This Question: 
If Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such a st... :   = 
Already adopted 
 
Q43 You indicated that your plan has already adopted a pay-for-performance (P4P) strategy for 
pharmacies in your network.  
 
 
In a few sentences, please briefly describe how bonuses are determined. (i.e. what level of 
performance ratings need to be met, how level of performance in a network alters bonus amount, 
what is an approximate bonus amount for various levels of performance?) 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such a st... :   = 
Already adopted 
 
Q44 You indicated that your plan has already adopted a value-based contracting strategy for 
pharmacies in your network; specifically, that you utilize a DIR fee adjustment strategy.  
 
 
In a few sentences, please briefly describe how DIR fees are adjusted. (i.e. what level of 
performance ratings need to be met, how level of performance in a network alters fee, what what 
is an approximate amount of DIR fee altered for various levels of performance?) 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Display This Question: 
If Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such a st... :   = 
Already adopted 
 
Q45 You indicated that your plan has already adopted a value-based contracting strategy for 
pharmacies in your network; specifically, that you utilize a medication reimbursement 
adjustment strategy.  
 
 
In a few sentences, please briefly describe how mediation reimbursements are adjusted. (i.e. 
what level of performance ratings need to be met, how level of performance in a network alters 
fee, what what is an approximate amount of medication reimbursement altered for various levels 
of performance?) 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such a st... :   = 
Already adopted 
 
Q46 You indicated that your plan has already adopted a quality-based network (QBN) strategy 
for pharmacies in your network; specifically, that you utilize a tiered structure (preferred vs. non-
preferred) strategy.  
 
 
In a few sentences, please briefly describe how pharmacies are delegated to different levels of 
"preference". (i.e. what level of performance ratings need to be met, how level of performance in 
a network alters tier structure placement, what incentives are there for patients to visit a 
"preferred" pharmacy?) 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Display This Question: 
If Please rate your likelihood to adopt each type of strategy. If you have already adopted such a st... :   = 
Already adopted 
 
Q47 You indicated that your plan has already adopted a quality-based network (QBN) strategy 
for pharmacies in your network; specifically, that you utilize a narrow network (i.e. network 
lockout) strategy.  
 
 
In a few sentences, please briefly describe the decision-making process to how pharmacies are 
removed from the network. (i.e. what level of performance ratings need to be met, how level of 
performance in a network affects network inclusion, are there opportunities for a pharmacy to 
rejoin the network?) 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
(SHOW AT CONCLUSION OF SURVEY) 
 
Q48 This concludes the survey.  Thank you for your contribution to understanding how health 
plans are evaluating quality performance ratings and implementing performance strategies for 
pharmacies in their network.  
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Pharmacist Interview Guide 
 
The purpose of the following interview is to understand the opinions and perspectives of retail 
pharmacists to performance strategies being implemented by health plans and Pharmacy Based 
Managers (PBMs). 
 
This research as been approved by the University of Mississippi Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). There are no identifiable risks associated with this study. The interview will be recorded 
so that you and I can talk casually, without the need for taking notes.  You and the pharmacy you 
represent will remain completely anonymous for your participation in this project. You have the 
right to withdraw at any point in the interview. If you decide at any point you do not want to 
finish the interview, let me know and the interview will conclude at once. You also have the right 
to skip any questions you prefer not to answer. By conducting this interview, you are giving your 
explicit consent to participate in this study, and for use of what you have to say to be used in the 
analysis of this study, as well as for dissemination of study results. By conducting this interview, 
you are additionally giving explicit permission to use anonymous quotes from our conversation 
in dissemination of results. 
 
Do you have any questions before we begin? 
 
Guide 
 
1. How well do you feel you understand the incentive strategies that plans and PBMs are 
implementing to boost pharmacy performance ratings? 
 
a. What aspects/components do you wish you knew more about? 
 
2. How do you assess your own quality performance ratings? 
 
a. Are there any internal systems of assessment?  
b. Do you use a third-party, such as EQUiPP? 
 
3. What are your thoughts on whether achieving higher quality performance scores is good 
for patients or not?  
 
4. What barriers are there for pharmacies to meet quality performance targets?  
 
a. Are the targets realistic? 
b. Do pharmacists have enough control in the interaction with the patient to achieve 
high performance scores? Why or why not? 
c. What additional resources do you believe would be needed to achieve the highest 
quality performance targets? 
d. Describe your thoughts on whether pharmacy practice sites have to significantly 
alter current practices to meet quality performance targets. 
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5. How much do you think the emphasis on achieving higher quality performance for each 
patient facilitates an opportunity for a closer working relationship with other health 
professionals? 
 
a. Describe how other healthcare professionals will work with pharmacists to 
achieve higher quality performance targets? 
b. Which other healthcare professionals do you believe should work with 
pharmacists to achieve higher quality performance targets? 
 
6. (Refer to pre-read) Out of the strategies discussed in the pre-read, which of these 
strategies have you heard of so far? 
 
a. Which ones have you seen used so far? 
b. Have any of the strategies been used within your own pharmacy? If so, which 
one(s)? 
 
7. Out of the three strategy types previously described, which do you prefer and why? 
 
8. What are your thoughts on what the positive and negative aspects of the P4P model 
would be if it was implemented in part of your organization? 
 
a. Would it be a welcome change? 
b. How well do you think P4P models would motivate your pharmacy to meet or 
exceed quality performance targets? 
 
9. What are your thoughts on what the positive and negative aspects of the value-based 
contracting model would be if it was implemented in part of your organization? 
 
a. Would it be a welcome change? 
b. How well do you think value-based contracting models would motivate your 
pharmacy to meet or exceed quality performance targets? 
 
10. What are your thoughts on what the positive and negative aspects of the QBN model 
would be if it was implemented in part of your organization? 
 
a. Would it be a welcome change? 
b. How well do you think QBN models would motivate your pharmacy to meet or 
exceed quality performance targets? 
 
11. Under which type of strategy do you believe you would strive to reach the highest quality 
targets? (if not already answered in previous questions) 
 
12. Do you believe that there are any other ways that plans can incentivize or help 
pharmacies to achieve higher quality performance targets? 
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13. Overall, do you believe quality performance strategies are good or bad for the profession? 
Why? 
 
a. What’s good about them? 
b. What’s bad about them? 
 
14. Is there anything else we have not discussed that you believe would be important to this 
discussion? 
 
Thank you very much for your time.  You have been incredibly helpful in understanding the field 
of pharmacy’s point of view of health plans implementing pharmacy performance strategies. 
Once the study is concluded, would you like to receive an executive summary of the findings?   
[Conclude] 
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Marketing and Management Ethics, University of Mississippi 2012 
Instructor: Scott Vitell, Ph.D. 
 Explored deontological ethical decision making models, discussed popular ethical 
theories in relation to various aspects of marketing and management (e.g. job 
satisfaction, job turnover, etc.), and proposed new antecedents of ethical behavior.  
Developed two papers on potential relationships of ethics in the retail pharmacy 
setting. 
 
General Linear Models, University of Mississippi 2012 
Instructor: John Bentley, Ph.D., R.Ph. 
 Examined basic theory and application of general linear model (GLM) analytical 
techniques toward research, including simple and multiple linear regression 
analyses. 
 
Secondary Data Techniques, University of Mississippi 2012 
Instructor: Ben Banahan, Ph.D. 
 Instructed on various techniques and principles of using secondary data to answer 
research questions, including data and data source evaluation, accessing and 
preparing secondary databases, and review of common data types and sources.  
Also, constructed a white paper on the general lack of national consensus on 
medications designated as “specialty drugs.” 
 
Health Economics, University of Mississippi 2012 
Instructor: Yi Yang, M.D., Ph.D. 
 Discussed theory and established practices of U.S. health economics, including 
current expenditure policy issues, health care reform, and economics of the 
uninsured. Additionally, gave a presentation on how the Affordable Care Act 
would affect Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI) and conducted a study using 
national MEPS data for characteristics of the uninsured utilizing the emergency 
department (ED). 
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Primary Data Techniques, University of Mississippi 2012 
Instructor: David J. McCaffrey, Ph.D., R.Ph. 
 Studied primary research techniques related to pharmaceutical marketing and/or 
pharmacy management, including sampling, instrument development, and data 
collection using several personal interview and self-administered survey 
techniques.  Working as a team, fielded a national survey exploring pharmacy 
faculty stress. 
 
Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Policy, University of Mississippi 2012 
Instructor: Erin Holmes, Ph.D., Pharm.D. 
 Discussed health care policy and research relating to Medicare, Medicaid, Private 
Insurers, how the Affordable Care Act would affect outcomes in current health 
care, roles of different health care professionals, whether we were responsibility 
allocated health care dollar, etc. Additionally, I completed a policy paper on the 
HITECH act and how the Meaningful Use clause could potentially be interpreted 
by hospital administrators for health information technology. 
 
Data Management and Statistical Software, University of Mississippi 2012 
Instructor: Pat Pace, Ph.D. 
 Introduced and instructed to techniques of data management and how to become 
proficient in SAS programming for such purposes. 
 
Research Methodology and Techniques, University of Mississippi 2011 
Instructor: Donna West-Strum, Ph.D., Pharm.D. 
 Examined a broad overview of the research process from project inception to its 
conclusion, including problem statement, hypothesis generation and testing, 
measurement, research design, sampling theory, data collection and analysis, and 
ethical conduct in research. 
 
Pharmacoeconomics, University of Mississippi 2011 
Instructor: Yi Yang, M.D., Ph.D. 
 Discussed principles and analytical techniques in assessing the overall value of 
pharmaceutical products, services, programs, and other health care interventions.  
Also, conducted a decision-modeling analysis on using allopurinol vs. febuxostat 
for gout. 
 
Quantitative Methods in Psychology I, University of Mississippi 2011 
Instructor: Nick Prins, Ph.D. 
 Learned basic analysis designs related to descriptive statistics, probability theory, 
hypothesis testing, linear regression, analysis of variance, experimental design, 
nonparametric and multivariate techniques, and computer application. 
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CERTIFICATIONS 
Basic Life Support for Healthcare Providers  March 2008 – May 2012 
American Heart Association 
 
Medication Therapy Management  March 2010 
American Pharmacists Association 
 
Immunization Certification  October 2008 
American Pharmacists Association 
 
HIPAA Compliance Training  August 2008 
University of Mississippi Medical Center 
 
 
SKILLS 
 Computer Software 
 SAS (Proficient), Statistical and administrative claims data analyses 
 SPSS (Proficient), Statistical and administrative claims data analyses 
 TreeAge (Proficient), Decision modeling 
 Microsoft: Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook (Expert) 
 Adobe Photoshop (Proficient) 
 
 
